Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!bu.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!uflorida!mephisto!mcnc!rti!ntpdvp1!kenp
From: kenp@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Ken Presting)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Searle and Radical Translation (was: Re: Searle and Biology)
Summary: Equal Opportunity Obsrvation
Message-ID: <607@ntpdvp1.UUCP>
Date: 20 Jul 90 14:26:25 GMT
References: <14265@enera.isi.edu> <602@ntpdvp1.UUCP> <1595@oravax.UUCP> <1603@oravax.UUCP>
Organization: SNA Solutions Inc., Contract Programming Group
Lines: 55

> > > (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> > > However, Searle denies the validity of using behavior as a test for
> > > intelligence. What else is there? Well, introspection: I know that I
> > > think because I experience myself thinking. This introspection doesn't
> > > get me any closer to knowing that *brains* (plural) think; only that
> > > *I* think.
> >
> > (Ken Presting) writes:
> > This is either a misreading of Searle, or an (unwarranted) assumption about
> > the implications of his views.
> 
> You misunderstood the above paragraph. The only idea that I am
> attributing to Searle is that he "denies the validity of using
> behavior as a test for intelligence". 

He does NOT deny this, and neither do I!  (I happen to think the Turing Test
is too simplistic, but the Radical Translation procedure  advocate is every
bit as behavioral).  Searle assumes "Minds have semantics" and "Programs
can't generate semantics".  It follows immediately that "Programs can't
generate minds."   This has nothing to do with the question of how you decide 
whether a specific system has a mind, or any semantics.
l
> 
> > He is concerned *only* with programs and the consequences of
> > implementing them.  In particular, he denies that implementing a
> > program attaches any semantics to the symbols it prints.
> 
> Yes, that is exactly what I mean by Searle's double standard. He
> insists that behavior (implementing a particular program) is not
> sufficient for establishing understanding on the part of computers,
> but it seems to me that behavior is exactly what we have to go on in
> deciding that other people have understanding. The idea of the Turing
> test is that to be fair, we should apply the same criterion for
> understanding to machines that we do to all people other than ourselves:
> we let judge based on behavior.

I think you are conflating two distinct issues: the truth-conditions for
a statement, and the types of evidence that can support the statement.
The Turing Test claims that a certain sort of evidence should be adequate
to establich the truth of the claim that a certain computer is thinking.
Searle does not care (much) about the kind of evidence that we should look
for in deciding the intelligence of computers.   He is just saying that
whatever kind of evidence we look for, it had better support the claim
that the computer has semantics.  

Quine and Davidson *have* addressed the issue of what sort of evidence
can establish the semantics of a symbol-manipulation system.  They also
believe (and I agree) that the Radical Translation/Interpretation process
is how we each justify our confidence that our fellow humans mean what
they seem to be saying.

There is no double standard.


Ken Presting