Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!samsung!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!rpi!batcomputer!cornell!oravax!daryl
From: daryl@oravax.UUCP (Steven Daryl McCullough)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Searle and Radical Translation (was: Re: Searle and Biology)
Summary: Ken Presting has been defending Searle for too long.
Message-ID: <1606@oravax.UUCP>
Date: 20 Jul 90 21:40:04 GMT
References: <14265@enera.isi.edu> <602@ntpdvp1.UUCP> <1595@oravax.UUCP> <607@ntpdvp1.UUCP>
Organization: Odyssey Research Associates, Ithaca NY
Lines: 67

In article <607@ntpdvp1.UUCP>, kenp@ntpdvp1.UUCP (Ken Presting) writes:
> > (Daryl McCullough) writes:
> >
> >The only idea that I am attributing to Searle is that he "denies the
> >validity of using behavior as a test for intelligence".
> 
> He does NOT deny this, and neither do I!

Ken, you have been defending Searle for too long; you are starting to
confuse your own beliefs with his. The whole *point* of the Chinese
room argument was that behavioral tests for intelligence could *never*
be enough. He assumed at the outset that the Chinese room was able to
pass the Turing Test; that behaviorally it was indistinguishable from
a human being.

Don't claim to speak for Searle unless you are willing to give
evidence: where, in anything that Searle has said, did he indicate
that he accepted using behavior as a test for intelligence? Where did
he give any indication that he believed in your Radical Translation
stuff? To me, these two positions seem diametrically opposed to what
Searle was saying.

> (I happen to think the Turing Test is too simplistic, but the
> Radical Translation procedure advocate is every bit as behavioral).

WHOEVER SAID THAT SEARLE BELIEVED IN THE RADICAL TRANSLATION
PROCEDURE???

The way you described it, radical translation is a special case of the
Turing Test. Any behavioral test you want to perform is perfectly
permissable in the Turing Test. If by performing the radical
translation one can determine that the entity behind the curtain is a
thinking being, then said being passes the Turing test.

> Searle assumes "Minds have semantics" and "Programs
> can't generate semantics". It follows immediately that "Programs can't
> generate minds." This has nothing to do with the question of how you decide 
> whether a specific system has a mind, or any semantics.

Ken, I think you are distorting Searle's already dubious argument. I
thought the Chinese room argument was supposed to *prove* that
"programs can't generate semantics". If he assumed it at the start,
then what was his argument supposed to show?

Anyway, the Chinese room argument certainly *was* about "how you
decide whether a specific system has a mind". The system in question
was the Chinese room itself. Does it have a mind separate from
Searle's or not? Searle claimed not, but my question is, on what
basis?

> Quine and Davidson *have* addressed the issue of what sort of evidence
> can establish the semantics of a symbol-manipulation system.  They also
> believe (and I agree) that the Radical Translation/Interpretation process
> is how we each justify our confidence that our fellow humans mean what
> they seem to be saying.
> 
> There is no double standard.

Ken, this is absolutely incredible! The paragraph above, which you
claim supports (or at least, does not contradict) Searle's position,
in fact *refutes* Searle's position. Searle assumed at the outset that
the Chinese room passed every behavior criterion for understanding
Chinese. And yet, Searle claimed that the room did not understand
Chinese. Searle is therefore explicitly *not* using any kind of
behavioral test for intelligence!

Ken, your arguments are certainly confusing, if not contradictory.