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From: baldwinj@manta.nosc.mil (Justin D. Baldwin)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Naval Aviators and Surface Warfare Officers
Message-ID: <1990Jul25.004727.7047@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 25 Jul 90 00:47:27 GMT
Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker)
Organization: Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego
Lines: 43
Approved: military@att.att.com



From: baldwinj@manta.nosc.mil (Justin D. Baldwin)

mlfisher@ohstpy.mps.ohio-state.edu writes:
>The point I was trying to make is that aviators are GENERALLY not tactically
>proficient in surface ship operations.  That is where they get the carrier into
>trouble.  What good are all those strike aircraft if they are at the bottom of
>the sea?  IT HAPPENS EVERY FLEETEX!!!  We will fight how we train, and we
>certainly don't train how we intend to fight.

The primary resistance, among carrier aviators, to a surface officer's
commanding an aircraft carrier is due to the fact that the CV CO is the
one who makes the determination as to whether it is safe to launch aircraft.
Most of us, myself included, don't much appreciate the idea of that decision
being made by someone whose ass has never been in that particular sling.

The only specific complaint I've seen here about aviator proficiency in 
surface ship tactical operations is lack of appreciation of the submarine
threat.  My personal, highly biased, view of the source of this problem is
that it is almost impossible for anyone except a strike or fighter aviator
to get into that career path.  The battle group commanders, carrier CO's,
CAG's, and super-CAG's are extremely rarely S-3 aviators and *never*
helo aviators.  Just take a look at how the S-3 and helo assets are treated
by the airwing during a FLEETEX (particularly when $$ start to run short)
for confirmation of this.

It looks like we're going to get away with having allowed this state of affairs
to exist, however:  with the relative decline of the USSR as a naval threat,
ASW protection of the CVBG becomes less important relative to its role as
a strike asset in the ongoing conflict with Third World Crazies [TWC's].  
However, it is well to remember that there are plenty of subsurface threats
in that theatre as well.  Since the primary goal of TWC's is to politically
embarass the US, there is a strong incentive to use all of those surplus
Romeos, Foxtrots, Kilos, and Charlies out there in an attempt to damage a
US capital ship.
--
>From the catapult of:               |+| "If anyone disagrees with anything I
   _, J. D. Baldwin, Comp Sci Dept  |+| say, I am quite prepared not only to
 __||____:::)=}-  U.S. Naval Academy|+| retract it, but also to deny under
 \      / baldwin@cad.usna.navy.mil |+| oath that I ever said it." --T. Lehrer
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