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From: forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Chalmers on Searle
Keywords: Other minds
Message-ID: <6022@milton.u.washington.edu>
Date: 8 Aug 90 00:22:53 GMT
References: <619@ntpdvp1.UUCP> <53619@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <25761@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
Lines: 50

Some approaches to the other minds problem causes me to have serious concerns.

In article <25761@cs.yale.edu> blenko-tom@cs.yale.edu (Tom Blenko) writes:
>In article <53619@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>|Searle's argument is all about introspection.

>I don't think Searle would agree with this.  My recollection is that
>his reasoning goes something like this:  we individually have conscious
>(introspective) experience and we have come to ascribe that
>consciousness to other (similar) intelligent entities.  If we were to
>discover that an entity displaying the necessary behavioral
>characteristics nevertheless lacked introspective experience, we would
>not consider it intelligent.

>Evidence for the former is immediately
>accessible and relates directly to introspection.  Evidence for the
>latter [...] has more to do
>with communication, shared experience, and social conventions than with
>introspection, per se.

Similar is a very subjective attribute.  I will come back to this after I
consider the clause in which it appears.

I am confuse about what is claimed in "we have come to ascribe that 
consciousness to other (similar) intelligent entities."  At first I thought
"similar" applied to "intelligent entities," but then I saw the paragraph
ends "we would not consider it intelligent."  I have come to reread the passage
"we individually have conscious (introspective) experiences and have come to
ascribe consciousness and intelligence to other similar entities."  The problem
comes down to defining "similar entities."

The phrase "If we were to discover that an entity discover displaying the
necessary behavioral characteristics nevertheless lacked introspective
experience, we would not consider it intelligent" (I presume this is due
to lack of similarity) leads me to discount behavior as a basis for similarity.
How are we to determine capability for "introspective experience" if not 
through behavior?  I am left with "similar" implying "physically similar."

I am very uncomfortable with basing similarity on physical attributes.  I can
imagine gender, skin color, etc. being used as a basis for physical similarity.
When these attributes are used as a basis for intelligence descrimination can
be justified.

I sure no one in this group would use skin color as a basis for intelligence
but any other physical attribute is just as baseless.  Each human is different
from the next and we cannot know the basis for our "introspective experience"
does not lie somewhere within this difference.  How are we to determine
capability for "introspective experience" if not through behavior?

--gary forbis