Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uwm.edu!ux1.cso.uiuc.edu!iuvax!cogsci!dave From: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Chalmers on Searle Message-ID: <53776@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> Date: 8 Aug 90 21:51:27 GMT References: <53619@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <25761@cs.yale.edu> <53635@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <25771@cs.yale.edu> Sender: news@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu Reply-To: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Organization: Indiana University, Bloomington Lines: 78 In article <25771@cs.yale.edu> blenko-tom@cs.yale.edu (Tom Blenko) writes: >Other intentional states Searle mentions are joy, fear, love, hunger, >and exhilaration. I understand his claim to be that if you believe an >entity has all of these intentional properties, and then you discover >that it doesn't really, then you will no longer suppose it to have >a mind. Don't you think most people would agree? Hey, I agree with this to a large extent. I'm a great believer in the importance of consciousness to mind. Given that Searle's argument proceeds by establishing a lack of consciousness in certain creatures, the question that we must ask is: for what properties P, traditionally regarded as mental, is it true that P must necessarily be accompanied by consciousness? Now joy, hunger, even understanding may well be such properties. Therefore, if the Chinese Room is not conscious, then it cannot understand, feel joy, be hungry, etc. The only claim I made in the original article is that intentionality is not such a property -- or at least that the link between intentionality and consciousness is highly disputable. Most of the discussion of intentionality in the last 20 years of the philosophy of mind has proceeded without ever using the notion of consciousness, and I take the lesson to be that the two are quite separable. Searle may disagree, but he doesn't produce any arguments for this in the BBS paper. Assuming for now that Searle's argument does establish the non-consciousness of the Chinese Room (which it doesn't, but never mind that for now), then we may go along with Searle in saying that certain intentional attributions like "understands X" may not be made to the Chinese room. However, this does not imply that the Chinese Room lacks intentionality. The problem with the above attribution lies in the "understands", not in the "X". So even if the Chinese Room does not "understand X", it may still "schmunderstand X", or something. So, while Searle's arguments might establish that certain intentional properties may not be attributed to the Chinese Room, it does not establish that *no* intentional properties may be ascribed to the Chinese Room. ("Belief", for instance, is an intentional property that is often taken to be quite independent of consciousness.) Note that I'm not saying *anything* about "mind" or "intelligence". I'd probably be happy to concede that lack of consciousness implies lack of mind, although "mind" is a very ambiguous, multi-faceted term. The point is solely a point about intentionality -- i.e. semantics. I don't see any reason why semantics, even "intrinsic semantics", should require full-blown consciousness. >But I think this misses an important point (in the same way that many >previous postings to this group have): irrespective of what (objective) >evidence for X is available or justifiable, each of us concludes X or >not-X every day. This is true. However, concluding X does not make X true. Our "everyday" reasoning is fallible. One hopes, although there is no guarantee, that rigorous science and philosophy will allow us to establish X or not-X in a more reliable way. Unless you want to argue that there is no "fact-of-the-matter" about X, over and above our everyday judgments. This may be true for certain X (such as "likeability", perhaps), but I don't see any reason why it should be true for "consciousness". At the very least, it is a premise of Searle's argument that there is an objective fact-of-the-matter about such questions, and I tend to agree with him about this. "Intentionality" is slightly trickier. Searle certainly believes there is a fact-of-the-matter about such things. On the other hand, Dan Dennett has made a career out of the argument that attributions of intentionality are for the most part observer-relative. >I don't think one understands Searle's (or anyone else's) argument >until one can both attack and defend it. I agree with this, and have done both many times (the former more often than the latter, but the latter is sometimes necessary when Searle's arguments are misinterpreted or underestimated). Not now, however. -- Dave Chalmers (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu) Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University. "It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."