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From: cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: emergence
Message-ID: <1990Oct4.152527.28413@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Date: 4 Oct 90 15:25:27 GMT
References: <3531@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> <JSP.90Oct3123040@milton.u.washington.edu>
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Organization: University of Waterloo
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In article <JSP.90Oct3123040@milton.u.washington.edu> jsp@milton.u.washington.edu (Jeff Prothero) writes:
>Perhaps the key characteristic of an 'emergent phenomenon' is that it
>has interesting characteristics which it possesses *independently* of
>the underlying (implementation) system? We avoid analysing computer
>programs in terms of electron diffusion not just because such an
>analysis would be awkward, opaque and difficult, but because it is, in
>a fundamental sense, *irrelevant*.  The same computer program could be
>run on a VLSI-based machine, a vacuum-tube based machine, an
>optical-based machine, a Tinker-Toy(R)-based machine, or
>hand-interpreted by a human.  Barring implementation defects, the
>behavior of the program will be the same in every case.
>
  I wish to differ with this, if only in a small detail.  A 'program'
is a conceptual entity only, what you are talking about here seems
to be a process.  The behaviour of the program+machine (process) will
differ quite a bit over various machines and possibly even on same
machine when run at different times.  It is the *interpretation* of
the results which is the same.  This is perhaps a minor point for your
discussion, but I think one has to be careful in maintaining the use/
mention distinction when talking about philosophy or principles.  A
program exists only in our minds, what exists in 'reality' is an
electronic state (insofar as that is definable) and changes of that
state.

>Understanding a computer program which implements Euclid's GCD just
>does not depend in any interesting fashion on the physics of
>TinkerToys, even if the program is destined to be run on a computer
>constructed from TinkerToys.
>
>Perhaps "emergent systems" generally may be characterised by a
>similar resilient self-integrity:  They possess interesting properties
>which are independent of the underlying system, and which in fact
>may be based on quite different underlying systems.  
>
Hmmm.  Let me see if I understand you correctly.  You are proposing
that an emergent is a meta-property observed only when a certain
conceptual entity is imposed on a physical system, and not observed
otherwise.  Of course, we are always imposing some conceptual entity
on 'reality', meaning we are conscious.

>Intelligent systems may possess properties which are quite independent
>of the specific characteristics of neurons, and may (potentially?) be
>manifested on systems with radically different low-level
>architectures.  Studying neurons may tell us as much about
>intelligence as studying TinkerToys does about Euclid's GCD algorithm.

I think that this is slightly beside the point, although it is very
true.  The question of emergence comes in at the point when we interpret
the TinkerToy's state(s) as being the solution to the GCD problem, but
have trouble interpreting its actions as being Euclid's algorithm.  If
we understand its 'answer', but cannot comprehend how it performs the
computation, then the "production of an answer to the GCD problem" must
be considered an emergent property of the TinkerToy, at least for the
time being.  By 'cannot' I mean "unable by any means, even in principle".
In this sense, your definition of emergent (as I have it :) is good
but incomplete; the "GCD solving" property of the TinkerToy is a meta-
property existing in the mind of the perceiver (whom I'll leave alone
here :), but with the proviso that this meta-property is not reducable
to that perceiver into more elementary meta-properties.  How this 
meta-irreducibility maps from the perceiver's mind to the real physical
world ('reality again'!) is another (and I think ultimately unanswerable)
question.

Please tell me if I've misinterpreted you! :>

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