Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!samsung!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!uflorida!haven!wam!reh From: reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Definition of (was Re: Testing for []) consciousness Message-ID: <1990Oct25.060856.3817@wam.umd.edu> Date: 25 Oct 90 06:08:56 GMT References: <27608@usc.edu> <1990Oct22.150143.13858@canon.co.uk> Sender: usenet@wam.umd.edu (USENET Posting) Reply-To: reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) Organization: University of Maryland at College Park Lines: 58 In article mikeb@wdl31.wdl.fac.com (Michael H Bender) writes: >> In article <1990Oct22.150143.13858@canon.co.uk> rjf@canon.co.uk >> (Robin Faichney) writes: >> In article >> mikeb@wdl31.wdl.fac.com (Michael H Bender) writes: >> >However, that does not mean that we should ignore the subject. I think it >> >would be very useful to come up with a meaningful definition of >> >consciousness (or at least human consciousness) because (1) It believe it >> >plays a critical part in our intelligence and (2) By understanding it, we >> >may improve our understanding of how computers can be used effectively. >> > >> >Mike Bender > >> I'd like to suggest that something be ascribed consciousness iff it can >> be the subject of experience: iff it is like something to be that >> thing. (This is lifted from T Nagel, actual references not to hand but >> available on request.) >> .... >> If you think it is like something to be a bat, that the bat experiences >> anything, then you think the bat conscious; if not, then not. >> ... Formulating a more objective definition is just trying to move >> the goal posts..... >> Actually, I think some AI people are resistant to this definition not >> because it upsets their professional picture, but because it upsets >> their personal picture -- as it does those of most of us. It is so >> radical that it takes a long time to sink in. (You mean there really >> is something which is *completely* subjective??) Though perhaps longer >> for some than for others! ;-) > >Whether or not consciousness is a completely subjective experience, there >appear to be characteristics/attributes/features of consciousness that are >shared among people (or at least that subset of people I have close contact >with). > >These characteristics might include: self-awareness, the ability to >change goal-directed behavior, an ability for empathy, etc. > >I believe there is value in understanding/specifying/defining/delineating/... >these characteristics, because whether subjective or not, they are all tied >up in the concept of consciousness and appear to go together. Thus, even if >we can't define consciousness, we can still, potentially, determine whether >the ability to change goal-directed behavior is related to the ability for >empathy, for instance. > >In other words, I do not know if consciousness can be defined, but I do >believed that it is possible to learn a lot about how we think/feel/operate >by studying it. > >Mike Bender > I don't mean to sound trite, but consciousness might be best described as the ability to ask, "what is consciousness?" If you don't have that, then all you have are layers of more-or-less self-awareness -- which is strictly a programmable feature essential for survival in biological systems, and result verification in computational systems.