Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!mcsun!ukc!canon!rjf From: rjf@canon.co.uk (Robin Faichney) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Definition of (was Re: Testing for []) consciousness Message-ID: <1990Oct25.085556.12119@canon.co.uk> Date: 25 Oct 90 08:55:56 GMT References: <27608@usc.edu> <1990Oct22.150143.13858@canon.co.uk> <3331@aipna.ed.ac.uk> Sender: Robin Faichney Reply-To: rjf@canon.co.uk Organization: Canon Research Europe, Guildford, UK Lines: 55 In article <3331@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes: >In article <1990Oct22.150143.13858@canon.co.uk> rjf@canon.co.uk writes: >>I'd like to suggest that something be ascribed consciousness iff it can >>be the subject of experience: iff it is like something to be that >>thing. (This is lifted from T Nagel, actual references not to hand but >>available on request.) > >Nagel's notion is a lot better at capturing what we seem to be referring >to when we use "consciousness" than some of the computational >convolutions recently posted. So how could we use it? How can we know if >it is "like something to be" -- for example -- this robot? It just isn't >good enough to try to finesse this problem by making it subjective, as >you have done: I can't finesse the problem by *making* it subjective; it *is* subjective whether you or I like it or not! >[ interesting accounts of Nicholas Humphrey, Gilbert Ryle and Julian Jaynes ] >Now I don't wish to start an argument about the ideas of Jaynes or >Humphrey, nor am I here supporting their ideas. What I do wish to >suggest is, like the poster who pointed out the etymology of the word >"conscious" ("knowing with", i.e. shared knowledge), that maybe >consciousness is primarily a *social* psychological phenomenon, a >cultural phenomenon, and that trying to seek its roots purely *inside* >your own particular mind might be as silly and misguided as trying to >put it into the mind of a machine. But I couldn't agree more! Consciousness seems to me to be a *concept* (not any sort of thing or process) which we use for social purposes. The point of the "its like something to be the conscious thing" definition (which I previously failed to make clear) is that it brings out the fact that ascribing consciousness is essentially equivalent to being willing to identify with the thing concerned -- to put oneself in its shoes. Deciding that it is like something to be a bat means that I am willing (even if not very able) to try to imagine what it is like to be a bat. I cannot conceive of it being like anything to be a house brick, ie I will not attempt to identify with it, ie I do not believe it conscious. Being willing to identify with people is a sine qua non for social behaviour as we know it (I am willing to say more on this if required). The ascription of consciousness means that I am willing to admit this thing to my social life, *to however slight an extent*. I do not think it out outrageous to say that the household animals of those who believe them conscious participate to some extent in the social life of their owners. (I happen to believe that the owners also participate in the social lifes of their pets, but then I'm a vegetarian! ;-) So the question "can we ever build a conscious machine" is functionally equivalent to the question "can we ever build a machine with which people are willing to socialise". I'm highly dubious, but I'll enjoy watching the efforts of the optimists!