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From: na0u+@andrew.cmu.edu (Nicholas G. Alexander)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Persian Gulf Combat Aircraft--The A-4 Skyhawk
Message-ID: <1990Oct26.020053.25883@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 26 Oct 90 02:00:53 GMT
References: <1990Oct8.030359.11680@cbnews.att.com> <1990Oct10.000344.29709@cbnews.att.com> <1990Oct11.051241.412@cbnews.att.com>,
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From: "Nicholas G. Alexander" <na0u+@andrew.cmu.edu>
I did a research paper on this two years ago, in my sophomore year.  Of
high school. (Yeah, I know.) So the information here may be a little
outdated.  But I believe that the information I gathered is valid still.
 Sources were various books about the air war in vietnam and two
articles in AIRMAN, the Air Force magazine.

The A-10 while great at its job, is old.  The warthog could probably
hold its own for a couple more years, but eventually age and maintanence
costs would pull them out of the air before ground fire ever got a
chance.

    So the DoD decided to do research on what kind of aircraft they
wanted to replace the A-10. Slow and well armored, or quick but
vulnerable?  

    Then they tried to decide who would have control of the aircraft. 
The army, who called the things in, or the Air Force, who has cart
blanche on aircraft.  After a battle, the Air Force won.

    Things went downhill from there.  The "flyboy syndrome" was never
more evident.  
    
    The army requested, nay, begged for another well armored, relatively
slow aircraft that could haul lots of ordinance, stay on station for
long periods, and plant the munitions it carried accurately.  From what
I have read, the army established in Vietnam that high speed jets were
not the best option for CAS.  There were often problems with the use of
F-4's as CAS, because the ordinance didn't go where it was supposed to.  

    The Air Force didn't like that at all.  Slow aircraft aren't
romantic.  Niether, for that matter, is dropping bombs on enemy troops. 
So the Air Force decided that they would make the job more "liveable" by
trying to force a slightly modified version of the F-16 into the role. 
The theory was that the A-16 would zip in and out so fast it couldn't be
hit.

    There are a couple of problems with this theory.  First of all,
"zipping in and out" does not lend itself to accurate ordinance
placement.  Secondly, no matter how fast you go through, the stuff
flying about in the air is going to cause damage.  With the A-16, that
damage is more than likely to be to a critical componet.

    On the surface, there appear to be financial advantages to using the
F-16.  Costs would go down because you are not making a new aircraft
from scratch.  But what good is cutting costs if you end up killing your
men when it counts, because the aircraft couldn't defend the grunts or
itself?  A

    So what you've got now is a big mess.  The A-10 is near the end of
its stint.  The army is not happy with what is being offered, and the
Air Force is not listening to their complaints.  This has turned into a
political battle instead of an effort to find an aircraft that will fit
its role.  The reasons for searching for a replacement for the A-10 are
becoming increasingly valid.  However, the reasons for picking it's
replacement are not.


Nick Alexander
Freshman, Carnegie Mellon & #1 Air Force Brat