Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!maytag!watdragon!violet!cpshelley
From: cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: Emergent Properties
Message-ID: <1990Nov1.155319.28698@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Keywords: chaos, science, prediction
Sender: daemon@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Owner of Many System Processes)
Organization: University of Waterloo
References: <1990Oct12.214636.7945@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <30@tdatirv.UUCP> <1990Oct19.201604.7280@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3369@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct26.214354.11063@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3383@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct31.001104.22908@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <1990Oct31.102704.18335@cscs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 90 15:53:19 GMT
Lines: 45

In article <1990Oct31.102704.18335@cscs.UUCP> csmith@cscs.UUCP (Craig E. Smith) writes:
>In <1990Oct31.001104.22908@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) writes:
>
>
>>In previous notes, I said lot of things, mainly supporting the value of a
>>traditional view of what is or is not "science".  Malcolm, at Edinburgh,
>>said many things defending the relatively looser (flexible?) view of
>>what is or is not science.  
>
>In the general sense of the word, a "science" is simply any subject
>which can be systematically studied in a logical manner, and the
>related body of knowledge generated by that study. In most cases,
>the decision of whether or not to call a particular study a science
>is primarily a political consideration, and is largely based on whether 
>one accepts that the field can be systematically, and logically 
>investigated.
>

  An interesting observation!  I have been looking for some succinct
statement about the philosophy of science since Gary Fostel brought
it up.  In going over my bookshelf, I found a few remarks by W.V.O.
Quine in _Methods of Logic_.

"Logic, like any other science, has as its business the pursuit of 
truth.  What are true are certain statements; and the pursuit of 
truth is the endevour to sort out the true statements from the others,
which are false....  But scientific activity is not the indiscriminant
amassing of truths; science is selective and seeks the truths that
count for the most, either in point of intrinsic interest or as
instruments for coping with the world." [pg xi]

  He goes on (if I can be trusted to paraphrase :) to describe a 
notion of a system of truths, and the anti-realist position that
such systems are conceptual only and not directly confrontable
with their "subject matter".  He also makes some suggestions on
method - ways of changing the system when its gives wrong predictions.
Would you characterize this as being a description of a "flexible"
notion of science, or a "well-understood" science?  Or is it a
matter of the quantity of truths known, something which Quine 
does not mention?
--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Fidelity, n.  A virtue peculiar to those 
cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu|  who are about to be betrayed."
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |				Ambrose Bierce