Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!mcsun!ukc!edcastle!aipna!cam From: cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Emergent Properties Keywords: chaos, science, prediction Message-ID: <3413@aipna.ed.ac.uk> Date: 1 Nov 90 18:43:58 GMT References: <1990Oct12.214636.7945@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <30@tdatirv.UUCP> <1990Oct19.201604.7280@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3369@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct26.214354.11063@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3383@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct31.001104.22908@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> Reply-To: cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) Organization: Dept of AI, Edinburgh University, UK. Lines: 121 In article <1990Oct31.001104.22908@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) writes: >Apparently I'm either a Humean (close enough to "human" that I like it), >or a Baconian, (a bit to porcine) and maybe even a Popperian (is this >a reference to the Marvel Omniverse Planet?) Nor was I able to recognize >the Lakatosian underpinnings of Malcolm's opinions. (I believe all of this >was my punishment for suggesting that a good grounding in the Philosophy >of Science would help people doing AI work.) You're right! >I don't recognize Lakatose, Imre Lakatos, and since his collected works (he died young) were sufficiently popular to appear in a paperback edition (1980), I'm suprised to find anyone professsing familiarity with philosophy of science who is not aware of his work. >but I'll bet a pint (if I ever make it to Edinburgh or vice versa) that he or >she did their writing and thinking around the time of WW II or just afterward >when supposed intellectual underpinnings were created to support the rise >of the "soft" sciences. Great! You owe me a pint of Murphy's! The first writings of Lakatos in our library start with edited proceedings of phil of sci conferences in 1965, and mostly occur in the 1970s (he died young in 1974). He was a philosopher of science concerned with mathematics and the hard sciences, and I can't offhand recall a mention of the soft sciences. Those of us who are fans of Lakatos regard him as the philosopher of science who is closest to understanding the scientific method. His analyses of Popper and Kuhn are the best such crits known to me. Phil of Sci is not my field, but, like most of the AI researchers I know, I think Phil of Sci very important. Here at Edinburgh (and at Sussex too), we think it sufficiently important that we even run courses in it for our AI students! (Yup, we teach them about Lakatos). >Malcolm reveals the same chip-on-the-shoulder attitude when he asks about the >shortcommings of "a view of the scientific method so narrowly dominated >by the particular practices of a few sciences as to condemn those too >different to the status of non-sciences?" Well, first of all, it is not >restricted to the practises of a few sciences, but there are a few fields of >enquiry in which the methods happen to be "scientific". He begs the question >in his statement of it. But the real point is that not being a science is >not "condemning" anything. It just means it is not a science. Lawyers are >not troubled to be in a non-scientific field, nor are doctors, artists, >engineers and a great many other respectable people. What is so bad about >not being a science? Nothing. I'm not being chip-on-shoulder, it wouldn't upset me at all not to be a scientist, it just so happens that I think that AI is a science. Why? Because (unlike law or engineering) AI is trying to understand something, to add to human knowledge of the Universe. The things we make, and the programs we write, are experiments designed to teach us something. >This has gotten too long again, but Malcolm asked me two specific questions >which I will address, namely do I believe: > > that AI is _properly_ a part of Computer Science [he continued] then > I'd be interested to hear why. For my part I think considering AI to be > a branch of CS is as silly as considering Astronomy to be a branch of > Optics. > >and > > that there are matters-of-fact in the > Universe to the discovery of which other methods than the scientific are > best fitted? > >The first seems to be a variation on the "When did I stop beating my wife" >classic. The realtive "size" and "scope" of astronomy and optics as the >question is posed is absurd and arguably insulting to astronomers and by >analogy, to Computer "Scientists". (Also not a science.) Well, I already knew that's how you felt about it, but I don't think the relative size and scope of the disciplines has much to do with the point of principle involved. You haven't answered my question, you have merely re-iterated your opinion. >The second is >not so crudely baited a hook, and much depends on what a "matter of fact" >is, but I'll bite and claim that Mathematics is an example where matters >of fact are discovered by non-scientific means. Are there other examples? >Well, yes ... for example ... AI .... (Sorry, couldn't resist.) I'm sure you don't suppose that AI is engaged in discovering logical tautologies, and I hope you will agree that one of the aims of AI is to discover what are the architectural principles of mind. That seems to me to be the kind of knowledge appropriately called scientific. Now you may very well suggest that some AI researchers are *bad* scientists, in that their methods are unscientific, and will not result in the kind of knowledge they claim to seek, but I understood your claim to be not that, but that AI is not a science. You still haven't explained why. [And you still owe me a pint of Murphy's!] Here's some Lakatos references: AUTHOR: International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science , 1965 , Bedford College, England * Lakatos , Imre , ed. TITLE: Criticism and the growth of knowledge / edited by Imre Lakatos, Alan Mu> IMPRINT: Cambridge University Press 1970 AUTHOR: International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science , 1965 , Bedford College * Lakatos , Imre , ed. TITLE: Problems in the philosophy of science / edited by Imre Lakatos [and] Al> IMPRINT: Amsterdam North-Holland Pub. Co. 1968 AUTHOR: Lakatos , Imre d. 1974 TITLE: Philosophical papers / Imre Lakatos / edited by John Worrall and Gregor> IMPRINT: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1978 (paperback edn 1980) AUTHOR: Lakatos , Imre d. 1974 TITLE: Proofs and refutations : the logic of mathematical discovery / Imre Lak> IMPRINT: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1976 -- Chris Malcolm cam@uk.ac.ed.aipna 031 667 1011 x2550 Department of Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh University 5 Forrest Hill, Edinburgh, EH1 2QL, UK