Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: utzoo!utgpu!watserv1!maytag!watdragon!violet!cpshelley
From: cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: Emergent Properties
Message-ID: <1990Nov2.025148.13754@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Keywords: chaos, science, prediction
Sender: daemon@watdragon.waterloo.edu (Owner of Many System Processes)
Organization: University of Waterloo
References: <1990Oct12.214636.7945@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <30@tdatirv.UUCP> <1990Oct19.201604.7280@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3369@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct26.214354.11063@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3383@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1990Oct31.001104.22908@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <1990Oct31.102704.1 <1990Nov1.204417.7120@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu>
Date: Fri, 2 Nov 90 02:51:48 GMT
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In article <1990Nov1.204417.7120@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary Fostel) writes:
>
>One of Quine's premises is clearly that science is broadly defined.  Like
>Lakotose, he was a post WWII writer.  I have trouble seeing logic as a science.
>For example, where are the experiments that add new assertions
>to the collected set that are not logically deducible from the existing set?
>My own notion of "science" is inextricably linked to experimentation, and 
>there is none in logic.  I'd like to replace Quine's "scientific activity"
>by "research activity" in his paragraph and then I'd be quite happy with it.
>

You may be comparing logic and (let's say) physics on uneven terms.  The
view of logic you appear to take is that of a timeless structure of
related statements, while physics progresses with time by experimentation.
New results in logic are achieved over time by coming up with 
conjectures (unproven statements), creating a derivation of them from
known results ("create" because there is no algorithm to produce them),
and submitting these for verification by peers.  Logicians' 'experiments'
are obviously more like the Gedankenexperiments of theoretical physics
than the directed operation of engineering tools in an experimental 
physicist's lab, but the function is analogous.  Certainly, there is
a difference in the physical undertaking of verification, but it is an
effect of refering back to the subject matter being investigated, and
not, I think, of some fundamental conceptual gap between the two.

It strikes me that the effort of withholding the term "science" from
things like logic, math, etc... is more a function of preference than
of necessity.

>Interestingly, there is never any emergence in logic.  A new assertion does
>not somehow emerge by virtue of some sort of critical mass of assertions. 
>At least not in logic.  "Human logic" is probably a different matter.
>

I believe your first statement there is debatable.  As I've argued
before, the axioms of a logic system themselves can be considered
'emergent' since their appearance is not predictable from their
composition (trivially, since they have no defined "parts" to be
composed of).  They exist and have meaning only because it seems
they should to people, not because their existance is 'revealed' to
us or because they impinge upon our senses - which is not sufficient
for knowledge anyway.

As to the second statement, I hope noone has proposed that assertions
arise magically.  Emergence in a system exists due to the inescapable
interaction of a subjective observer with system observed.  Both
philosophy and physics have had to come to grips with this during
the current century.  Whether we see information as existing only
at a particular minimum level of desciption says only something about
us (and our model), and is not binding on reality - at least that
is my contention! :>

Human logic?  Hmmm.  The discussions in this newsgroup are as good
a place as any to look at that!

PS.  I *do* realize that what I say is based on my own view of
'knowledge' and 'belief' which you may or may not share.  Since
this is a philosophy group, I have no apologies to make on that
score.  Disagree!  "The play's the thing" after all... :>
--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Fidelity, n.  A virtue peculiar to those 
cpshelley@violet.waterloo.edu|  who are about to be betrayed."
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |				Ambrose Bierce