Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!uakari.primate.wisc.edu!aplcen!haven!wam!reh From: reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Consciousness Message-ID: <1990Nov7.230521.1390@wam.umd.edu> Date: 7 Nov 90 23:05:21 GMT References: <10126@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> <5891@suned1.Nswses.Navy.MIL> Sender: usenet@wam.umd.edu (USENET Posting) Reply-To: reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) Organization: University of Maryland at College Park Lines: 96 In article <5891@suned1.Nswses.Navy.MIL> lev@suned0.nswses.navy.mil (Lloyd E Vancil) writes: >In article <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) writes: >>If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at >>least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is >>in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness >>is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. > >Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's >not conscious. I think your second comment was closer to the mark. Could it >be that what we call consciousness is a continum, a thing that has no boundrys >and is therefore undefinable because it is unknowable in its totality? > >I am remineded of the thought experiments proposed by those who are speculating about N demesional space. Specifically, how would a 2d critter percieve the >intrusion of a 3d critter into 2d space and conversly, how would we, as 3d >critters, preceieve 4d critters intrusion into our space? > >In the same sense, could consciousness be the by-product of some other process? >Could consciousness be an "Emergent property" of some other function? Like the >2d critter that sees a 2d "slice" of a 3d object suddenly "pop" into existance, >could consciousness be a "3d slice" of some more complex function? > >I guess "Emergent" would be a missnomer, devolving might be better. > >I'm not proposing some mystical solution for the question, it is possible for >us to propose n-demesional critters so why couldn't we understand some more >complex function? > >L. >-- > * suned1!lev@elroy.JPL.Nasa.Gov sun!suntzu!suned1!lev > . lev@suned1.nswses.navy.mil + . > + * S.T.A.R.S.! The revolution has begun! * > My employer has no opinions. These are mine! >In article <1990Oct27.070636.4144@wam.umd.edu> reh@wam.umd.edu (Richard E. Huddleston) writes: >>If we can't define consciousness (not that I'm so sure of that), we can at >>least study it by it's leavings: memories. Anything that can _remember_ is >>in some way conscious. Perhaps the problem with defining consciousness >>is similar to defining life; it doesn't have just one form or one aspect. > >Too simple. My computer remembers, better than I do, and I'm 99.999% sure it's >not conscious. I think your second comment was closer to the mark. Could it >be that what we call consciousness is a continum, a thing that has no boundrys >and is therefore undefinable because it is unknowable in its totality? Two thoughts come to mind here: one, that is storage of bits equivalent to the rich, sensory impressions I retain and call memory? While I admit to being pretty new to the field, it seems that we have nowhere near the types of data structures that would enable the computer to _remember_ that continum of impressions that we so easily accumulate. The second thought that struck me was that it may be possible the Herbert Simon is right in his rather dry and unsentimental assessment of consciousness: that consciousness is merely the pool that our biologically programmed processes swim in -- and our experience of consciousness is both quantitatively and qualitatively absolutely no different from what a machine might experience in the carrying out of its function. But it seems that his opinion is highly outdated, and solves the consciousness problem by eliminating the data that don't agree with his Skinnerish view. Minsky's Frames concept, on the other hand, seems perpetually valid -- if one considers the list elements as structures of varying, rather than single, type. Frames then provide an organization and context-grouping method for data structures of varying and complex type: sense, emotion, procedure, etc. Kind of like multi-media (right term?), where all kinds of data is linked together in a meaningful fashion. When we get an operating system that deals with those types of structures as primitives, we may finally have a thinking machine. >I am remineded of the thought experiments proposed by those who are speculating >about N demesional space. Specifically, how would a 2d critter percieve the >intrusion of a 3d critter into 2d space and conversly, how would we, as 3d >critters, preceieve 4d critters intrusion into our space? > >In the same sense, could consciousness be the by-product of some other process? >Could consciousness be an "Emergent property" of some other function? Like the >2d critter that sees a 2d "slice" of a 3d object suddenly "pop" into existance, >could consciousness be a "3d slice" of some more complex function? P.D. Ouspensky, _The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution_? What an interesting analogy. It seems here that we run into the unverifiability issues; lots of ideas abound in certain circles about what consciousness might be -- but those circles are also populated by kooks and con-artists. Personal experiences of various forms of consciousness are subjective. >I guess "Emergent" would be a missnomer, devolving might be better. > >I'm not proposing some mystical solution for the question, it is possible for >us to propose n-demesional critters so why couldn't we understand some more >complex function? Again, I'm not so sure of the certainty of verification. But an interesting question, nonetheless. Lots to think about.