Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!psuvax1!julius.cs.uiuc.edu!usc!samsung!uunet!tdatirv!sarima From: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Searle's Chinese Room Message-ID: <57@tdatirv.UUCP> Date: 9 Nov 90 20:05:44 GMT References: <7014@castle.ed.ac.uk> <16197@mentor.cc.purdue.edu> <3952@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> Reply-To: sarima@tdatirv.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) Organization: Teradata Corp., Irvine Lines: 102 In article cw2k+@andrew.cmu.edu (Christopher L. Welles) writes: >I've just finished a paper on Searle's "Minds, Brains, and Programs." >Just thought I'd post it to see what other people thought. Anyone agree >with me?? ... > An analogy to this would be a neuron in the brain. It merely >reacts according to specified rules, a program. Even if it were capable, it >would have no understanding of what it's actions represented to the whole >system, i.e. the mind. Pulses are just received and sent according to a >set of rules. ... This is very critical. There is *no* part of the brain which understands, only the whole brain, operating normally can be said to understand. Certainly any given part of the brain, when examined in detail, performs a rather rigid, relatively simple data transformation. This has been true for *every* brain region so far studied. The cerebellum is a particularly good example. Any given region of the cerebellum performs an *identical* tranformation, yet due to its external wiring it may perform any of several functions, including balance, muscle tone, motion smoothing, and perhaps others. Other section of the brain are similar in that they are data transformers that do not 'care' where the data came from or where it is going. [Of course this whole discussion applies to individual neurons in spades] ... > By this, and other comments, intentionality seems to be some >method of letting the brain know, without referring to other symbols, >what the symbols coming in mean. Sort of like a dictionary entry for each >symbol coming in, but instead of defining it in words( themselves symbols >), it simply carries the meaning: "for intentionality there must be >intentional content in addition to the formal symbols."(The Behavioral >and Brain Sciences, p. 454) > Of course, how do you communicate meaning without referring >to symbols? This is the very thing that Searle supposes biological material >is capable of, and that's why we can't make a program that involves, in >and of itself, understanding. It depends upon the material to contain the >meaning. Lets look at a description of how we see things according to >Searle: Oh wonderful :-) And just what does he see in brains that provides this non-referential semantics? How do patterns of neuronal firing differ from any other symbolic system? [A pattern of neuronal firings is as much a symbol as anything else, it has no particular relationship to any meaning it might have] As far as I can see Searle's basic problem is a lack of understanding of neurobiology. He seems to have no concept of the current state of neural science, especially with regard to how a brain processes data. >"From where I am seated, I can see a tree. Light reflected from the tree in >the form of photons strikes my optical apparatus. This sets up a series of >sequences of neural firings. Some of these neurons in the visual cortex are >in fact remarkably specialized to respond to certain sorts of visual stimuli. >When the whole set of sequences occurs, it causes a visual experience, and >the visual experience has intentionality. It is a conscious mental event >with an intentional content."(The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, p. 452) >It follows an expected sequence at first, but then, after the neuron >firings, is >suddenly translated into something with intentionality. Notice that, it is >no longer represented by symbols(i.e. the firing of the neurons) but is >instead, by the great power of organic material, now carried around the >brain as an image. Oh foo!! This is starting to get totally silly. I have a hard time believing anyone, even Searle could really believe this! What does he think a 'visual experience' is if it is not a pattern of neuronal firing?? Jeez! [So some of the earlier neuron in the chain have a very specific response mode, most of these are essentially the preprocessor that converts light into an internal mental model (i.e. into symbolic form). It is not until the more complex cells of the tertiary visual areas are reached that we can talk about symbols in any meaningful sense. But even there everything is still a pattern of neuronal firing.] And what in blue blazes is an 'intentional content'? If he just means that the symbols have a behavioral significance, so what? If he means something else, what is its physical basis in brain activity? [And if it *has* no physical basis, he is just reinventing dualism] > His whole ridiculous idea of intentionality, and the idea that >somehow the meaning must be passed on to that agent carrying out the >program hinges on the idea that the understanding is done by the agent. And it thus becomes a problem of infinite regress - where is the 'agent' in the human brain? How does a brain qualify as an 'agent'? >... That, however, only leads to breaking it down >further and further. Is there sum sub-atomic particle that does the >understanding for us. Quite, and even then, who's to say we have reached the end??? As you can see I basically agree with you. And I am coming from a background in the biological sciences. Searle is a biological idiot. My main problem with AI as a field is that I think most research is approaching the problem bass-ackwards. Too much time is being spent on finding 'reliable' reasoning paradigms for artificially contrained, highly unnatural domains. This is *not* how natural intelligence works. -- --------------- uunet!tdatirv!sarima (Stanley Friesen)