Path: utzoo!censor!geac!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!ub!uhura.cc.rochester.edu!rochester!pt.cs.cmu.edu!o.gp.cs.cmu.edu!andrew.cmu.edu!cw2k+ From: cw2k+@andrew.cmu.edu (Christopher L. Welles) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Searle's Chinese Room Message-ID: <8bDqHlK00VsLBAOkxp@andrew.cmu.edu> Date: 13 Nov 90 03:13:53 GMT References: <16197@mentor.cc.purdue.edu> <3952@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> <10297@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA Lines: 59 In-Reply-To: In <10297@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> larryc@poe.jpl.nasa.gov (Larry Carroll) writes: >It would be interesting to ask Searle if he thinks that an alien creature >with a base in an entirely different biology could be intelligent or have >consciousness. Say, fluorine-silicon rather than hydrogen-carbon, using >thermal energy reactions that mimic our form of oxidation. Or something even >more radical: plasma life-forms living in a stars chromosphere, using fusion >reactions rather than chemical reactions. In, fraser@bilby.cs.uwa.oz.au (Fraser Wilson) writes: >What he was essentially saying was that a >_formal system_ (which is what a computer is) can never be conscious. >I think the systems reply essentially chucks this one right out the >window where it belongs :-). Just thought I should point out. Searle did make it clear that "formal systems", computers, could be conscious. He emphasized the fact that humans were such systems. His main thesis went something to the effect of: That there mere instantiation of a program could not be in itself, sufficient for for consciousness. In this, he is saying that consciousness somehow depends upon the "stuff" that the computer is made out of. In fact, he did claim that, Martians, for example, might have consciousness, as well, but it would depend upon the "stuff" they were made out of. Somehow, conscious systems, unlike another formal system, could not be represented in any symbolic structure. The material had to have this special property of intentionality. Something, he theorized, only maybe human brains had. Throughout Searle's Chinese room paper, it is easy to misunderstand what Searle is saying. Just the fact that what he's saying really doesn't make any sense, causes one to read into it something completely different. A major problem with the commentaries is that almost no one really understood all that Searle was saying. Many of the arguments there were designed to deal with the point they thought Searle was trying to make. What he actually said was just too ridiculous. Only after reading his response to several of the commentaries can it really understood what Searle is saying. When I first read his Chinese room paper, itself, I read it three times just to figure out what he was saying about intentionality. Even then it wasn't clear though. Only after reading some commentary on it, as well as Searle response to the commentary did I have any chance of figuring out what he was really saying. I usually assume that the writer is a rational human being. It looks as if that just doesn't apply for Searle. I suppose that last isn't really true, it just that Searle had absolutely no concept of how a computer, or a computer program actually worked. It's obvious that Searle was arguing about a subject in which he had absolutely no background. Anyone, dealing either with computers, or (is it operational psychology?) would have immediately seen such an idea was wrong. <<<<< Chris >>>>>