Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!csri.toronto.edu!me Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy From: me@csri.toronto.edu (Daniel R. Simon) Subject: Re: Searle's Chinese Room Message-ID: <1990Nov14.204858.15170@jarvis.csri.toronto.edu> Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto References: <16197@mentor.cc.purdue.edu> <3952@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU> <10297@jpl-devvax.JPL.NASA.GOV> Date: 15 Nov 90 01:48:58 GMT Lines: 94 Followers of the current debate in this newsgroup on Searle's "Chinese room" argument, who are familiar, through my last posting here, with the Laboratory for Artificial Appearance, may be interested in an email message I received from a friend and contact there not long ago. [For those who are unfamiliar with the LAA, it was originally the graphics group within the computer science department of a university that shall remain nameless. It owes its inspiration (and its new name) to a revolutionary paper, published some time ago in an obscure graphics journal, which introduced the concept of "artificial appearance" by proposing the following test: a room is fitted with two high-resolution CRT monitors, one of which is connected to a camera pointed at a real person in another room, and the other of which receives its input from a computer graphics generation program. If a viewer is unable to tell, by scrutinizing the two screens, which one displays the image of a real human being, the paper's author argued, then there is no reason not to assume that the computer has artificially generated human appearance. This so-called "blurring test" has revolutionized thinking about computer graphics, prompting heated philosophical debates about the nature of human appearance, and radically altering prevailing opinions on the best approaches to its artificial simulation.] Here is the message I received: Hi, Dan! I hope you enjoyed your visit with us, and that your next visit will be soon. Several people here at LAA have remarked to me that they found their discussions with you to be most fruitful. I thought I'd bring you up to date on recent developments since you left. At that time, the mood here was (as I expect you perceived) fairly confident among us; we felt (and still feel) that while we have only begun to make a dent in the huge problems involved in creating artificial human appearance, we have at least been making steady progress towards that goal. Imagine our surprise when a well-respected local professor of philosophy here began, just a few days later, distributing advance copies of a soon-to-be-published article he wrote, arguing that artificial human appearance is not merely difficult to achieve, but actually impossible in principle! Our surprise quickly turned to scorn, however, once we were able to study his arguments in detail. His main premise is that human appearance is inherently "continuous", and cannot be simulated by any "discrete" representation, such as a computer would generate. He illustrates his thesis as follows: suppose that he were to possess the entire text of such a representation (in, say hexadecimal code) for the appearance of a 21-year-old Chinese man in traditional wedding garb. Suppose further that a particular video monitor receives its input not from a camera or digital input, but from a device which turns short, sharp tapping sounds into numbers (the way telephone exchanges do when old-style "pulse" telephones are dialed). Then, merely by tapping on the table (or on himself, if necessary), he can, in principle, conjure up on this monitor the image of said 21-year-old Chinese man. "Does that mean", the author asks provocatively, "that I look Chinese?" I expect I need hardly point out to you the obvious flaw in this "Chinese groom" argument. It is clearly not the man himself, but the whole array of person, text, and monitor that realizes the appearance of the Chinese man. The author himself even recognizes the possibility of this refutation, admitting that the presence of the text may make his claim of Chinese appearance suspect; he replies with a revised scenario in which he has memorized the entire text. However, he never follows the objection to its logical conclusion, recognizing that the whole combination of "hardware" and "software" can be said to be forming an artificial human appearance. In retrospect, I find it somewhat puzzling that his paper has garnered so much attention, given the weakness of its arguments. I'm interested to hear your opinion, of course, but I'd be surprised if you lent his propositions any more credence than we have. Anyway, keep in touch, and let me know when you'll be in the area again. D----. (I include here my reply to him:) Well, I certainly agree with you that the philosophy professor's argument seems weak--after all, surely there is some level (molecular? subatomic?) at which the real appearance of a real person is either discrete or negligibly different from a discrete representation of it. On the other hand, I have some nagging questions about your willingness to localize appearance in what seems to me to be a rather arbitrary way. If a person, a text, an electronic apparatus, and a monitor can be said to have a human appearance, then what about the person, the text, the apparatus, the monitor, and the stand on which the monitor rests? Or all of these things, plus me? Do two people look like one person? Does a volleyball team? The earth, including all its inhabitants? I get the feeling that if I were compelled to localize human appearance (at least as defined by the "blurring test"), I would do so in an altogether different way. But I suppose I'd best defer to the experts on that score. Anyway, best of luck with your research, and I hope to visit again some time soon. "There *is* confusion worse than death" Daniel R. Simon -Tennyson (me@theory.toronto.edu)