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From: ms@ai.toronto.edu (Manfred Stede)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: musings on Godel's theorem
Message-ID: <90Nov23.145255est.6582@neat.cs.toronto.edu>
Date: 23 Nov 90 19:53:14 GMT
References: <11351@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU>
Organization: Department of Computer Science, University of Toronto
Lines: 28

In article <11351@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU> news@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU (USENET News) writes:

> 
>On a different topic, I think it is presumptuous at best and irresponsible
>at worst for claims about machine intelligence to be made from a supposed
>basis in Godel's proof, as Nagel and Newman do in their work (and also as
>in the article on the subject in Scientific American):
> 
>``Godel's conclusions bear on the question whether a calculating machine
>can be constructed that would match the human brain in mathematical
>intelligence.  Today's calculating machines have a fixed set of directives
>built into them; these directives correspond to the fixed rules of inference
>of formalized axiomatic procedure.  But, as Godel showed in his incompleteness
>theorem, there are innumerable problems in elementary number theory that fall
>outside the scope of a fixed axiomatic method; and that such engines are
>incapable of answering, however intricate and ingenious their built-in
>mechanisms may be and however rapid their operations.''
> 

If one believes s/he can use one of Goedel's proofs to show that artificially
intelligent programs are impossible, s/he should also believe that databases
and spreadsheets are impossible. I very much agree that it is 'presumptous at
best' to transfer formal proofs from computability theory to intelligence
theory and claim that the underlying processes are identical. -- After all, we
do have databases and spreadsheets, and they work most of the time, don't they?


manfred stede, ms@ai.toronto.edu