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From: msellers@mentor.com (Mike Sellers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Consciousness
Message-ID: <1990Nov21.045833.11768@mentor.com>
Date: 21 Nov 90 04:58:33 GMT
References: <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> <3489@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <15724@venera.isi.edu>
Organization: engr
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In article <15724@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
>In article <3489@aipna.ed.ac.uk> cam@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>>In article <1990Nov9.202525.11717@ncsuvx.ncsu.edu> fostel@eos.ncsu.edu (Gary
>>Fostel) writes:
>>
>>>  I looked up Kuhn's "definition" of science, wondering if cog. sci, 
>>>  AI or related subjects would fit. ....
>>>  In that book he is clearly describing how things are rather than how they
>>>  ought to be.  
>>
>>This is one of Lakatos' criticisms of Kuhn, which he lampoons as the
>>"democratic model of science", i.e., it's science if most scientists
>>think it is.
>
>It certainly is an easy target for lampoon, but we ought to appreciate how
>sticky the situation can become.  I am reminded of an analogous remark I
>included on a recent article on algorithmic composition of music, when I
>claimed that "we may be able to say little more than that music education
>is that which entitles one to have his behavior judged as 'musical' after
>his education is complete."  

Which brings to mind the "music" of, say, John Cage or Laurie Anderson.  For
many people, music seems to be one of those things that they are able to
recognize without a distinct set of criteria, even if (or maybe especially
if) they are not deeply musically educated.  The same often seems to hold
true with non-scientists' views of what it is that scientists do and what 
science is, with equally frustrating results for the scientist as for the
performance artist.  

>Trying to define science is no easier than trying
>to define music.  Musicians assume patterns of behavior based on those of other
>musicians (Satie's definition:  "Music is what happens at concerts.");  so it
>would not be ludicrous to say that scientists assume patterns of behavior based
>on those of other scientists.

It is not ludicrous to say, and in fact is a widely held attitude -- all you 
have to see this in action is wander into a lab and watch a graduate student 
and his or her advisor at work!  However, this sort of description is 
unsatisfying, and leaves the reader with the distinct impression that these 
scientists (or musicians, or artists, or politicians) don't really *know* what
it is that they are about, and that they are once again trying to snow us all
so they can spend more of our taxpayer dollars on some fool project.  It also 
weakens the case often touted by those championing the conclusions of science,
that as a method of describing the world it is somehow qualitatively better 
than what the poor ignorant souls of previous eras had available to them.  
If we cannot describe science any better than to say that 'science is what 
scientists do, and what scientists do, precisely, is what other scientists do',
then I suggest that science and its practitioners are not epistemilogically 
in a position that is any more defensible than any other describer of the 
world, such as a shaman, priest, philosopher, artist, or politician.  If this
is the case, then it ought to give all who claim to practice science pause,
and remind us all of the true fallibility of this epistemilogical paradigm 
that lurks beneath its seemingly robust crust.

> Stephen Smoliar
>Internet:  smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu


-- 
Mike Sellers     msellers@mentor.com     Mentor Graphics Corp.

"I used to think that the brain was the most wonderful organ in my
body.  Then I realized who was telling me this." -- Emo Phillips