Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!usc!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!bu.edu!att!cbnews!cbnews!military
From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Command of Close Air Support
Message-ID: <1990Nov29.002224.18476@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 29 Nov 90 00:22:24 GMT
Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker)
Organization: University of Rochester Computer Science Department
Lines: 35
Approved: military@att.att.com



From: crowl@cs.rochester.edu (Lawrence Crowl)
There was much discussion in this group about the US Air Force's apparent
indifference to close air support.  In particular, posters assert that the A16
is an attempt to sneak more fighters in while giving lip service to close air
support.  I asked my father, a retired navigator/bombadier/weapons officer,
about this.  His response was that the Air Force's belief is that you cannot
do close air support without air superiority.  So, you want to be able to
devote all resources to achieving air superiority (including bombing
airfields), and once achieved, you can convert to close air support and
striking supply lines.  Converting from air superiority to close air support
requires multi-role aircraft.  Hence the choice of the A16 rather than a
next-generation A10.

The argument for multi-role aircraft works under either of two situations:
when the cost effectiveness of a single multi-role aircraft is better than
that of two single-role aircraft; and when the number of aircraft is limited
(by space in carriers, by treaties on land).  If neither of these situations
holds, then the air force could produce separate planes, but it need not.  On
the other hand, if the army controlled close air support, the planes would
always be separate, and probably less cost-effective.  I contend that
supporters of army control of close air support must prove that two
single-role aircraft are cheaper than a single multi-role aircraft; that the
number of aircraft is not limited by treaty, maintenance, supply, or space;
*and* that these situations will hold over the long term.  (It makes little
sense to shuffle close air support between the services.)

Do you buy my argument?  What are other arguments for and against air force
control of close air support?

-- 
  Lawrence Crowl		716-275-9499	University of Rochester
		      crowl@cs.rochester.edu	Computer Science Department
		 ...!rutgers!rochester!crowl	Rochester, New York,  14627