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From: smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Searle, Strong AI, and Chinese Rooms
Summary: still trying to get Turing's story straight
Message-ID: <15878@venera.isi.edu>
Date: 1 Dec 90 22:06:14 GMT
References: <1990Nov15.204949.12075@Solbourne.COM> <1990Nov19.191925.28285@cs.umn.edu> <15798@venera.isi.edu> <1990Nov30.231103.17041@cs.umn.edu>
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In article <1990Nov30.231103.17041@cs.umn.edu> thornley@cs.umn.edu (David H.
Thornley) writes:
>
>He then suggests that, in about 2000 AD, machines will exist (with gigabyte
>storage) such that they will fool many people much of the time, and also
>says that he thinks that, by this time, it will be possible to "speak of
>machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted."  My reasoning
>from this is that Turing thinks that his test is somewhat connected with
>the basic question, "Can machines think?"
>
"Somewhat" is a well-chosen word.  I still think that David's reading is not
quite on the mark.  To make my case, I would like to provide a bit more context
for his quotation from Turing:

	I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible
	to programme computers, with a storage capacity of about 10**9,
	to make them play the imitation game so well that an average
	interrogator will not have more than 70 per cent chance of
	making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.
	The original question, "Can machines think?" I believe to be too
	meaningless to deserve discussion.  Nevertheless I believe that
	at the end of the century the use of words and general educated
	opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak
	of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.

Thus, having told his story about the imitation game, Turing still dismisses
the prospect of pondering his original question as basically a waste of time.
As I have said before, I am inclined to agree with him, leaving the question
to philosophers while the engineers go off and try to do something useful.

On the other hand, David is quite right that a computer which is mistaken for
a human is not necessarily a "winner" at Turing's original imitation game.  I
would guess, however, that he would have been content to accept an example of
ELIZA being confused for a human as a reasonable alternative solution to his
original problem.  After all, the scenario is not that different:  Humans are
communicating through typewriters, and the question is one of whether or not
a computer could be successfully substituted for a human.  (One of the factors
Turing probably did not count on was a tendency of people who use computers too
much to start talking like them, thus giving the computer an added edge on
winning the game!)

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