Path: utzoo!censor!geac!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!sdd.hp.com!news.cs.indiana.edu!rutgers!ub!rapaport From: rapaport@acsu.buffalo.edu (William J. Rapaport) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Searle, Strong AI, and Chinese Rooms Message-ID: <50670@eerie.acsu.Buffalo.EDU> Date: 11 Dec 90 22:20:16 GMT References: <1990Nov15.204949.12075@Solbourne.COM> <27320@cs.yale.edu> Sender: news@acsu.Buffalo.EDU Organization: State University of New York at Buffalo/Comp Sci Lines: 33 Nntp-Posting-Host: adara.cs.buffalo.edu In article mark@adler.philosophie.uni-stuttgart.de (Mark Johnson) writes: > >Drew McDermott makes the interesting claim that in Searle's >Chinese Room, we wind up communicating with a "virtual person". I may have missed McDermott's posting, but the notion of a virtual person was discussed in a paper presented at the American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings last April: Cole, David J. (1990), ``Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity,'' paper presented at the Colloquium on AI, American Philosophical Association Central Division, New Orleans, 27 April 1990. Cole can be contacted at phil@ub.d.umn.edu (he's in the Phil. Dept. at Univ. of Minnesota/Duluth). My reply is available in LaTeXable form by emailing me at rapaport@cs.buffalo.edu, or in hardcopy from Sally Elder, Dept. of Computer Science, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260; ask for: Rapaport, William J. (1990), ``Computer Processes and Virtual Persons: Comments on Cole's `Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity','' Technical Report 90-13 (Buffalo: SUNY Buffalo Dept. of Computer Science, May 1990). William J. Rapaport Associate Professor of Computer Science Center for Cognitive Sciencew Dept. of Computer Science||internet: rapaport@cs.buffalo.edu SUNY Buffalo ||bitnet: rapaport@sunybcs.bitnet Buffalo, NY 14260 ||uucp: {rutgers,uunet}!cs.buffalo.edu!rapaport (716) 636-3193, 3180 ||fax: (716) 636-3464