Path: utzoo!attcan!telly!lethe!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!know!news.cs.indiana.edu!att!cbnews!cbnews!military From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: point and area defense Keywords: missile ship anti aircraft Message-ID: <1990Dec15.011604.12543@cbnews.att.com> Date: 15 Dec 90 01:16:04 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories Lines: 50 Approved: military@att.att.com From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) In speculating on the possible outcome of attacks against US (and allied) naval vessels, it may be instructive to review the performance of contemporary weapons: 1. The Stark's defensive system (including the humans) exhibited serious flaws, starting with command and control. Threat assessment failed. CIWS failed because the automatic mode can't be used if there are any radar-reflective targets within its acquisition range (i.e., it tends to shoot up any local friendlies or enemies). Some of the shortcomings have been fixed. My opinion: similarly equipped ships are in trouble if area defense fails. 2. Aegis can shoot down large targets at a range that should provide some area defense capability. Command and control is still suspect. Ability to classify targets is in question. 3. Area defenses are probably the easiest to defeat. In the Falklands, area defense (Sea Dart) could not engage targets under 2,000 ft. Threat assessment failed, leading to the loss of the Sheffield to an Exocet attack (they detected the Super Etendard when they popped up to acquire target before launch, but did not interpret this as an attack). Flying low was quite effective against the British area defenses (I know, this is not the Brits, we're better, blah, blah). 4. Point defenses are not as effective as they are advertized, partly due to the lack of ideal conditions. Sea Wolf can defend OWN ship, but can't engage targets headed for other ships, for example. Broadsword, with Sea Wolf, could not defend itself and Coventry (Sea Dart) unless it could get exactly between Coventry and the attacking aircraft. The attacking Argies did not oblige, and the Sea Wolf would not engage targets not aimed at itself. Result: Coventry sunk. Each of these systems demonstrated at least one serious (fatal?) flaw when put into action. Assuming that the flaws have been corrected since, all should be well. Hardly. It means that we can expect to find OTHER flaws, probably. The more complex the systems, the more likely it will be to find flaws. Also note that in the first three examples, the major screw up involved the HUMAN part of the system. The waters of high-tech, whiz-bang warfare is very uncharted. In particular, there is very little experience in operating with degraded systems. You may recall photos of US ships at GQ in the Gulf with people on the superstructure with Stinger missiles. These are probably the most effective close-in systems available (i.e., reliable, available, high probability of a hit per shot).