Path: utzoo!censor!geac!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!news.cs.indiana.edu!att!cbnews!cbnews!military
From: deichman@cod.nosc.mil (Shane D. Deichman)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: WHat happened to USS Stark (was Re: Anti-Balistic Missiles Now)
Message-ID: <1990Dec17.051322.29553@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 17 Dec 90 05:13:22 GMT
References: <1990Dec7.011307.474@cbnews.att.com> <1990Dec8.221641.27118@cbnews.att.com> <1990Dec12.030935.9815@cbnews.att.com> <1990Dec13.032943.18680@cbnews.att.com> <1990Dec15.012050.13269@cbnews.att.com>
Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker)
Organization: Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego
Lines: 47
Approved: military@att.att.com



From: deichman@cod.nosc.mil (Shane D. Deichman)

I haven't read the IEEE Spectrum article (Sept 87) re: the shooting of the 
USS STARK.  However, what I do understand about the incident is that:

1)  The crew aboard STARK had no reason to be alarmed when the Iraqi
Mirage approached the ship -- they frequently flew down the Gulf to
attack Iranian ships.

2)  Something about the refractive properties of the local air allowed
the TAO aboard STARK to acquire the Iraqi aircraft with a surface search
radar (as opposed to an air search or fire control radar); I am uncertain
if any other actions (i.e., using a different radar) would have required a
course change.

3)  The attempted communications with the Iraqi pilot proved fruitless, as 
they usually did.  Iraqi pilots only listened to two channels -- their own 
and the one used by Iranian air networks.

4)  The "lock on" alarm on the Mirage was calibrated for fire control radar
signatures, not surface search radars.  The pilot never knew he had been
acquired (even if the system in question was non-threatening).  Whenever
Iraqis got a little too close for comfort, lighting them up with the SM2
fire control radar ALWAYS made them turn away....

5)  Since the plane had been illuminated with the longer-wavelength surface
search radar, the separation of the Exocet with the Mirage was not detected.

6)  The actual detection of the missile didn't occur until about six seconds
before impact, when the Exocet active radar engages.  This radar would be
detected by the ESM aboard the ship -- and probably was....

There are a number of factors leading up to this catastrophe.  Most notably,
the error of the Iraqi pilot (who was green -- that was his first, and last
according to British sources, solo flight against Iranian shipping) in thinking
he had made a 90 degree turn when in fact he only turned 30 degrees, and the
unorthodox actions by the TAO who didn't believe it was necessary to request
a course change.

That last point is conjecture on my part.  The systems on STARK are fully
capable of dealing with such a threat; the crews are similarly proficient.
There were some hard lessons learned from this incident.  But the probability
of human error always exists....

-shane