Path: utzoo!mnetor!tmsoft!torsqnt!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!elroy.jpl.nasa.gov!ames!xn.ll.mit.edu!jjh From: jjh@xn.ll.mit.edu (James J. Hunt) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: George Lakoff on "Metaphor and War" Keywords: metaphor, cognitive psychology Message-ID: <1991Jan3.000622.1064@xn.ll.mit.edu> Date: 3 Jan 91 00:06:22 GMT References: <11483@pt.cs.cmu.edu> Organization: MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA Lines: 287 I applaud George Lakoff's analysis of the metaphors in decision making in regard to the gulf. However, there are some simplifications and oversights in his logic that need addressing. George writes: > > War as Violent Crime > >To bear in mind what is hidden by Clausewitz's metaphor, we >should consider an alternative metaphor that is _n_o_t used by pro- >fessional strategists nor by the general public to understand war >as we engage in it. WAR IS VIOLENT CRIME: MURDER, ASSAULT, KID- >NAPPING, ARSON, RAPE, AND THEFT. Here, war is understood only in >terms of its moral dimension, and not, say, its political or >economic dimension. The metaphor highlights those aspects of war >that would otherwise be seen as major crimes. There is an Us- >Them asymmetry between the public use of Clausewitz's metaphor >and the War-as-Crime metaphor. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is >reported on in terms of murder, theft and rape. The planned Amer- >ican invasion is never discussed in terms of murder, assault, and >arson. Moreover, the US plans for war are seen, in Clausewitzian >terms, as rational calculation. But the Iraqi invasion is dis- >cussed not as a rational move by Saddam, but as the work of a >madman. We see US as rational, moral, and courageous and Them as >criminal and insane. > Nor do we generally talk of our police forces' use of deadly force as being criminal either. For all but a very few of us, there is some line beyond which deadly force is considered justifiable. If this were not the case, we would not have police or military forces at all. They could serve not purpose. Also, those who choose to us deadly force without provocation in kind (the Iraqi Government), have already insulated themselves against this argument. The question becomes when is it appropriate and justifiable to use deadly force in response? > > Is Saddam Irrational? > This is asking some what the wrong question. The question is not is he acting in his own self interest, but rather can he be persuaded to change is course of action by anything we might say or do short of military action. > > What is Victory? > >In a fairy tale or a game, victory is well-defined. Once it is >achieved, the story or game is over. Neither is the case in the >gulf crisis. History continues, and ``victory'' makes sense only >in terms of continuing history. The president's stated objec- >tives are total Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the Kuwaiti >monarchy. But no one believes the matter will end there, since >Saddam would still be in power with all of his forces intact. >General Powell said in his Senate testimony that if Saddam with- >drew, the US would have to ``strengthen the indigenous countries >of the region'' to achieve a balance of power. Presumably that >means arming Assad, who is every bit as dangerous as Saddam. >Would arming another villain count as victory? If we go to war, >what will constitute ``victory''? Suppose we conquer Iraq, wip- >ing out its military capability. How would Iraq be governed? No >puppet government that we set up could govern effectively since >it would be hated by the entire populace. Since Saddam has wiped >out all opposition, the only remaining effective government for >the country would be his Ba'ath party. Would it count as a victo- >ry if Saddam's friends wound up in power? If not, what other >choice is there? And if Iraq has no remaining military force, how >could it defend itself against Syria and Iran? It would certainly >not be a ``victory'' for us if either of them took over Iraq. If >Syria did, then Assad's Arab nationalism would become a threat. >If Iran did, then Islamic fundamentalism would become even more >powerful and threatening. It would seem that the closest thing >to a ``victory'' for the US in case of war would be to drive the >Iraqis out of Kuwait; destroy just enough of Iraq's military to >leave it capable of defending itself against Syria and Iran; >somehow get Saddam out of power, but let his Ba'ath party remain >in control of a country just strong enough to defend itself, but >not strong enough to be a threat; and keep the price of oil at a >reasonably low level. The problems: It is not obvious that we >could get Saddam out of power without wiping out most of Iraq's >military capability. We would have invaded an Arab country, >which would create vast hatred for us throughout the Arab world, >and would no doubt result in decades of increased terrorism and >lack of cooperation by Arab states. We would, by defeating an >Arab nationalist state, strengthen Islamic fundamentalism. Iraq >would remain a cruel dictatorship run by cronies of Saddam. By >reinstating the government of Kuwait, we would inflame the hatred >of the poor toward the rich throughout the Arab world, and thus >increase instability. And the price of oil would go through the >roof. Even the closest thing to a victory doesn't look very vic- >torious. In the debate over whether to go to war, very little >time has been spent clarifying what a victory would be. And if >``victory'' cannot be defined, neither can ``worthwhile sacri- >fice.'' > In the military victory scenario we can and should use the UN and the Arab League to maintain short term order in Iraq and provide stability until a stable Iraqi democracy can be established. This will take a long time, but we need not be directly involved. > The Arab Viewpoint > >The metaphors used to conceptualize the gulf crisis hide the most >powerful political ideas in the Arab world: Arab nationalism and >Islamic fundamentalism. The first seeks to form a racially-based >all-Arab nation, the second, a theocratic all-Islamic state. >Though bitterly opposed to one another, they share a great deal. >Both are conceptualized in family terms, an Arab brotherhood and >an Islamic brotherhood. Both see brotherhoods as more legitimate >than existing states. Both are at odds with the state-as-person >metaphor, which sees currently existing states as distinct enti- >ties with a right to exist in perpetuity. Also hidden by our >metaphors is perhaps the most important daily concern throughout >the Arab world: Arab dignity. Both political movements are seen >as ways to achieve dignity through unity. The current national >boundaries are widely perceived as working against Arab dignity >in two ways: one internal and one external. The internal issue is >the division between rich and poor in the Arab world. Poor Arabs >see rich Arabs as rich by accident, by where the British happened >to draw the lines that created the contemporary nations of the >Middle East. To see Arabs metaphorically as one big family is to >suggest that oil wealth should belong to all Arabs. To many >Arabs, the national boundaries drawn by colonial powers are il- >legitimate, violating the conception of Arabs as a single >``brotherhood'' and impoverishing millions. To those impover- >ished millions, the positive side of Saddam's invasion of Kuwait >was that it challenged national borders and brought to the fore >the divisions between rich and poor that result from those lines >in the sand. If there is to be peace in the region, these divi- >sions must be addressed, say, by having rich Arab countries make >extensive investments in development that will help poor Arabs. >As long as the huge gulf between rich and poor exists in the Arab >world, a large number of poor Arabs will continue to see one of >the superstate solutions, either Arab nationalism or Islamic fun- >damentalism, as being in their self-interest, and the region will >continue to be unstable. The external issue is the weakness. >The current national boundaries keep Arab nations squabbling >among themselves and therefore weak relative to Western nations. >To unity advocates, what we call ``stability'' means continued >weakness. Weakness is a major theme in the Arab world, and is >often conceptualized in sexual terms, even more than in the West. >American officials, in speaking of the ``rape'' of Kuwait, are >conceptualizing a weak, defenseless country as female and a >strong militarily powerful country as male. Similarly, it is >common for Arabs to conceptualize the colonization and subsequent >domination of the Arab world by the West, especially the US, as >emasculation. An Arab proverb that is reported to be popular in >Iraq these days is that ``It is better to be a cock for a day >than a chicken for a year.'' The message is clear: It is better >to be male, that is, strong and dominant for a short period of >time than to be female, that is, weak and defenseless for a long >time. Much of the support for Saddam among Arabs is due to the >fact that he is seen as standing up to the US, even if only for a >while, and that there is a dignity in this. If upholding dignity >is an essential part of what defines Saddam's ``rational self- >interest'', it is vitally important for our government to know >this, since he may be willing to go to war to ``be a cock for a >day.'' The US does not have anything like a proper understanding >of the issue of Arab dignity. Take the question of whether Iraq >will come out of this with part of the Rumailah oil fields and >two islands giving it a port on the gulf. From Iraq's point of >view these are seen as economic necessities if Iraq is to re- >build. President Bush has spoken of this as ``rewarding aggres- >sion'', using the Third-World-Countries-As-Children metaphor, >where the great powers are grown-ups who have the obligation to >reward or punish children so as to make them behave properly. >This is exactly the attitude that grates on Arabs who want to be >treated with dignity. Instead of seeing Iraq as a sovereign na- >tion that has taken military action for economic purposes, the >president treats Iraq as if it were a child gone bad, who has be- >come the neighborhood bully and should be properly disciplined by >the grown-ups. The issue of the Rumailah oil fields and the two >islands has alternatively been discussed in the media in terms of >``saving face.'' Saving face is a very different concept than up- >holding Arab dignity and insisting on being treated as an equal, >not an inferior. > I believe the ``be a cock for a day'' mentality is understood. This is precisely why non military means of persuasion are bound to fail. We will not starve Iraq to death. Any other economic situation can be maintained indefinitely by a regime that has the will to kill all opponents. > > Kuwait as Victim > >The classical victim is innocent. To the Iraquis, Kuwait was any- >thing but an innocent ingenue. The war with Iran virtually ban- >krupted Iraq. Iraq saw itself as having fought that war partly >for the benefit of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where Shiite citizens >supported Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. Kuwait had agreed to >help finance the war, but after the war, the Kuwaitis insisted on >repayment of the ``loan.'' Kuwaitis had invested hundreds of bil- >lions in Europe, America and Japan, but would not invest in Iraq >after the war to help it rebuild. On the contrary, it began what >amounted to economic warfare against Iraq by overproducing its >oil quota to hold oil prices down. In addition, Kuwait had >drilled laterally into Iraqi territory in the Rumailah oil field >and had extracted oil from Iraqi territory. Kuwait further took >advantage of Iraq by buying its currency, but only at extremely >low exchange rates. Subsequently, wealthy Kuwaitis used that >Iraqi currency on trips to Iraq, where they bought Iraqi goods at >bargain rates. Among the things they bought most flamboyantly >were liquor and prostitutes-widows and orphans of men killed in >the war, who, because of the state of the economy, had no other >means of support. All this did not endear Kuwaitis to Iraqis, >who were suffering from over 70% inflation. Moreover, Kuwaitis >had long been resented for good reason by Iraqis and moslems from >other nations. Capital rich, but labor poor, Kuwait imported >cheap labor from other moslem countries to do its least pleasant >work. At the time of the invasion, there were 400,000 Kuwaiti ci- >tizens and 2.2 millions foreign laborers who were denied rights >of citizenry and treated by the Kuwaitis as lesser beings. In >short, to the Iraqis and to labor-exporting Arab countries, >Kuwait is badly miscast as a purely innocent victim. This does >not in any way justify the horrors perpetrated on the Kuwaitis by >the Iraqi army. But it is part of what is hidden when Kuwait is >cast as an innocent victim. The ``legitimate government'' that >we seek to reinstall is an oppressive monarchy. > We must be extremely carefull when we seek to change someone elses government. Democracy can not be declared by decree. They only time the US has managed to successfully install a democracy is when it has been willing buy the favor of the people and occupy the country for a long time after the establishment of the new government. This has happened only in West Germany and Japan after WWII. Every other time we have tried, we have failed: Russia in 1917, Germany 1918, Vietnam, the Philipines 1945, Korea 1945, any South American country, etc. Occupying Kuwait would be unacceptable, and I do not beleive the indigenous democratic movement is sufficiently strong to maintain power. Constitutional reform of the monarchy might be the right step. > > Things to Do > >War would create much more suffering than it would alleviate, and >should be renounced in this case on humanitarian grounds. There >is no shortage of alternatives to war. Troops can be rotated out >and brought to the minimum level to deter an invasion of Saudi >Arabia. Economic sanctions can be continued. A serious system of >international inspections can be instituted to prevent the >development of Iraq's nuclear capacity. A certain amount of >``face-saving'' for Saddam is better than war: As part of a >compromise, the Kuwaiti monarchy can be sacrificed and elections >held in Kuwait. The problems of rich and poor Arabs must be ad- >dressed, with pressures placed on the Kuwaitis and others to in- >vest significantly in development to help poor Arabs. Balance of >power solutions within the region should always be seen as moves >toward reducing, not increasing armaments; positive economic in- >centives can used, together with the threat of refusal by us and >the Soviets to supply spare parts needed to keep hi-tech military >weaponry functional. If there is a moral to come out of the >Congressional hearings, it is that there are a lot of very >knowledgeable people in this country who have thought about al- >ternatives to war. They should be taken seriously. > I do not beleive that Husien will leave Kuwait short of being militarily forced out. Arab pride will drive hom to remain in Kuwait. By waiting we only allow him more chance to dig in and make the final attack more bloody. Right now we could end run the forces in Kuwait and hit Bagdad directly. If we wait to long Husien will be able to fortify his entire boarder with Saudi Arabia. The cost of any long term presence of US troops in Saudia Arabia and/or Kuwait will drive a thorn deeper and deeper into the side of Arab pride. We must address this problem as soon as possible and get out. We can leave a UN and Arab league force in Iraq for ten years to stabilize the region with only a small commitment of US personnel involved. Countries like the USSR, Japan, and Germany that are unable to provide military support now would be able to provide peace keeping forces after Iraq is defeated. Then they could see themselves as preventing further conflict. We could further ally Arab anger by dealing decisively with the Palistinian question after the conflict is over. There is a growing feeling in the US that Israeli stubbornness on this issue has gone to far. By forcing this issue we become less the Imperialist and more the good cop. The last thing that George ignores is how the resolution of this conflict will effect future events all over the world. If at the end, it looks like the world community acted decisively to put down aggression, other locally strong countries will be less inclide to attack their neighbors, and other locally weak countries will not feel they must make themselves overly strong to protect themselves. If however, it seems that Hussein was successful with his adventure, others will follow his example, and we will have no arguments for weak countries not to try and obtain their own nuclear and chemical armaments. War is not desirable or admirable, but the world does need a credible deterrent to aggression. JJHunt