Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wuarchive!usc!ucsd!casbah.acns.nwu.edu!accuvax.nwu.edu!nucsrl!telecom-request From: wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (David Lesher) Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom Subject: Re: What are Secure Lines? Message-ID: <15782@accuvax.nwu.edu> Date: 4 Jan 91 00:36:56 GMT Sender: news@accuvax.nwu.edu Reply-To: David Lesher Organization: NRK Clinic for habitual NetNews abusers Lines: 59 Approved: Telecom@eecs.nwu.edu X-Submissions-To: telecom@eecs.nwu.edu X-Administrivia-To: telecom-request@eecs.nwu.edu X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 11, Issue 6, Message 3 of 8 |In the book, Cliff mentioned what he called a *secure |line*. When ever he called a government agency that meant business |(ie. FBI, NSA, CIA) they would call him back on one of these secure |lines. There is no such thing as a "secure line" for a phone call. Once it's out on lines in areas not totally controlled by your own trusted people, it's public. There did exist a class of service called "Special Service Protection" that BSP 460-110-100 discusses. It consisted of special caps on the test points, held on with exotic tie-wrap gadgets. You had to cut the tie to get across the pair -- at least it said that in the book. I figure it would take about thirty seconds to find another place to tap the line. If you need to discuss classified subjects on the phone, use a secure phone. These encrypt your voice with an algorithm that is approved by the appropriate federal agency. Possible sets include the old KY-3, the KY-71/STU-11 and the current favorite: the STU-III (Secure Telephone Unit). Before you ask, no - one model cannot call another. The phone on the far end, when equipped with correct key, decrypts the incoming data into (somewhat ;-} ) understandable voice. So what WAS Cliff talking about? I can hazard several outright guesses as to why the folks in the Intelligence Community would want to call him back each time, but they are guesses -- I have no inside data. 1) If you call back, you have a number. If nothing else, that lets you know where the Yo-Yo owner calling you is located. That's a good start to finding out more about him. It never hurts to know a little about the guy telling you your database is under attack;-} 2) It would take a LOT of manpower for the Bad Guys to collect and transcribe all the traffic on EVERY trunk to one of those building in Virginia or Maryland with the 10 ft barbed wire hedge. So I'd target some offices by extracting and looking at the incoming PBX TT data until I found a call to an extension of interest. This can be defeated to some extent by having lots of OUTGOING trunks, maybe from many locations interconnected by encrypted T1 trunks. When Mr. Trenchcoat wants an outgoing line, he randomly gets one from another site. 3) It sound more mysterious. 4) Some other reason. I'd take 1,4,3,2 as the order on the finish line, but you readers can make your own guess. I'll close with a line a retired Community member told me years ago: Never say ANYTHING on the black {i.e. non-STU} phone you don't want to read about tomorrow in the {Washington Post}. wb8foz@mthvax.cs.miami.edu (305) 255-RTFM 570-335 33257-0335