Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!uunet!spool2.mu.edu!sdd.hp.com!think.com!mintaka!bloom-beacon!eru!hagbard!sunic!sics.se!sics.se!torkel From: torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel Message-ID: <1991Jan18.175633.3319@sics.se> Date: 18 Jan 91 17:56:33 GMT References: <15303.9101181150@s4.sys.uea.ac.uk> Sender: news@sics.se Organization: Swedish Institute of Computer Science, Kista Lines: 27 In-Reply-To: jrk@information-systems.east-anglia.ac.uk's message of 18 Jan 91 11:50:22 GMT In article <15303.9101181150@s4.sys.uea.ac.uk> jrk@information-systems. east-anglia.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway CMP RA) writes: >Eh? How? We mustn't take this talk of seeing and realizing too seriously. The system of Principia Mathematica, if we mean what Russell and Whitehead actually wrote, is tricky even to formalize in a way that makes the assertion that it is consistent into a mathematical statement. (It can be done in a reasonable way, but few people have any occasion or reason to delve into the details, e.g. regarding the axiom of reducibility.) In the case of an unproblematically formal system such as ZFC, its consistency is not known to be provable in any mathematical sense, and whether or not one regards it as evidently consistent is very largely a matter of personal inclination and opinion. A serious examination of the concept 'humanly provable' will show that there is no well-defined totality of arithmetical statements that are 'humanly provable' in a wide sense, or the truth of which we can 'realize' or 'see'. In the present context, however, we are pretending that there is such a well-defined concept of 'humanly provable arithmetical statement' or 'humanly realizable arithmetical truth', and we're taking a very liberal view of what is thus 'realizable'. I think it's of interest to note that even on this assumption, there is nothing in Godel's theorem that implies that the 'humanly provable' statements are not recursively enumerable.