Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!uunet!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!mit-eddie!uw-beaver!milton!forbis
From: forbis@milton.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel
Message-ID: <14733@milton.u.washington.edu>
Date: 19 Jan 91 02:57:00 GMT
References: <1991Jan18.191303.6840@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1991Jan18.203249.7022@sics.se> <1991Jan18.223602.15474@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
Lines: 49

In article <1991Jan18.223602.15474@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>I've made so far a number of idealizations, all of which could be subject 
>to dispute:
>
>(1) Humans are consistent.
>(2) Humans know they are consistent.
>(3) Humans are capable of empirically discovering enough about the mind so
>    that if they in fact are simulable by a TM, they will know that a given
>    TM simulates them.
>
>A reply to the argument could be based on denying the possibility of any of
>these idealizations.  Minsky's response is based on the denial of the
>possibility of the idealization to (1).  Your response above appears to be
>based on the denial of the possibility of the idealization to (3).  I
>believe that these replies miss the point, as they're based more on
>empirical matters than the logical heart of the Lucas argument.
>
>In fact I believe that even if we accept idealizations (1), (2) and (3)
>we can still refute the Lucas argument, in a very clearcut fashion.
>Want to have a go?

I'm sorry I do not have the training to fully participate in this discussion.
I will none the less participate minimally.  I will restate your idealizations.

(1) I am consistent.
(2) I know I am consistent.
(3) I am capable of empirically discovering enough about my mind that I can
    tell when a given TM simulates me.

If I understand your argument correctly you want to hold these to be true when
you have already argued they cannot all be true.  I think you have also made
another idealization.  That is (4) The individual and the collective are 
arbitrary.

When I accept a new belief, I (to the best of my abilities) check the belief
for internal consistancy then check the consistancy of this belief with all
my previously held beliefs.  I recognize that some of my beliefs may be negated
without affecting the consistancy of the set.  This being so, I can imagine
another individual who is consistant, knows he or she is consistant, and know
the TM that simulates him or her.  When the two of us are considered together
we may no longer be consistent.  The difference between the individual and
the collective is not arbitrary.

I am not the same TM I was a moment ago.  The difference between the TMs at
any two moments is chaotic or random.

I hope this has not been too stupid.

--gary forbis@u.washingtion.edu