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From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel
Message-ID: <1991Jan19.185849.25779@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 19 Jan 91 18:58:49 GMT
References: <28154@cs.yale.edu> <1991Jan19.055638.27731@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1991Jan19.122052.29529@sics.se>
Organization: Indiana University, Bloomington
Lines: 16

In article <1991Jan19.122052.29529@sics.se> torkel@sics.se (Torkel Franzen) writes:

>  You are quite right, but I think those who are not familiar with this
>observation of Craig's may get the wrong idea. It should not be assumed
>that the formal system yielded by Craig's trick is anything like ZFC or
>other formal systems with comprehensible axiom schemas.

This is quite true, though of course it doesn't affect the argument.  I've
stressed before that the formal system in question may look nothing like
ZFC or other familiar systems.  The system is still subject to the Godel
argument.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."