Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!uunet!spool2.mu.edu!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!bronze!chalmers
From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel
Message-ID: <1991Jan21.022919.13895@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 21 Jan 91 02:29:19 GMT
References: <28154@cs.yale.edu> <1991Jan19.055638.27731@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <28203@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Indiana University, Bloomington
Lines: 23

In article <28203@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@cs.yale.edu (Drew McDermott) writes:

>Well, I think this idealization *is* unreasonable, and perhaps we
>should leave the dispute at that.

It comes down to whether you think a competence/performance distinction makes
sense when applied to human mathematical capacities (where competence
idealizes away from mistakes, death and boredom as performance factors).  It's
obviously controversial.  I think the notion makes some sense; enough sense
for the purposes of this argument, though it's not entirely clear-cut.
Others obviously disagree.  It's a complex matter that's probably not
worth getting into here.  (Look at all the debate the linguists have had over
the notion.)

If we accepted the notion, then the Lucas argument could be construed as
claiming that the set of arithmetical statements encompassed by human
competence includes statements that are outside the capacities of any given
TM.  This, I think, would be of some interest to AI.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."