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From: minsky@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU (Marvin Minsky)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel
Message-ID: <4963@media-lab.MEDIA.MIT.EDU>
Date: 21 Jan 91 18:05:48 GMT
References: <28154@cs.yale.edu> <1991Jan19.055638.27731@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <28203@cs.yale.edu> <1991Jan21.022919.13895@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Reply-To: minsky@media-lab.media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky)
Organization: MIT Media Lab, Cambridge MA
Lines: 21


In article <1991Jan21.022919.13895@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>
>If we accepted the notion, then the Lucas argument could be construed as
>claiming that the set of arithmetical statements encompassed by human
>competence includes statements that are outside the capacities of any given
>TM.  This, I think, would be of some interest to AI.

I don't see why anyone sould accept that statement.  But how 'bout
accepting:


  The set of arithmetical statements encompassed by human
  competence includes statements that are outside the capacities of
  any Turing Machines that are restricted to deducing the theorems of 
  certain consistent deductive systems -- and whose output strings are
  interpreted only in that sense.

And this would be of little interest to AI-ers.  At least, to those
trying either to make smart machines or constructive theories of
psychology or brain function.