Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!bonnie.concordia.ca!uunet!mcsun!ukc!keele!nott-cs!ucl-cs!news
From: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk (Gordon Joly)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Minds, machines, and Godel
Message-ID: <1376@ucl-cs.uucp>
Date: 21 Jan 91 16:46:09 GMT
Sender: news@cs.ucl.ac.uk
Lines: 28


In article <1991Jan16.035058.7465@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> David Chalmers stirs

> Dull around here.  How about everybody tries to give the decisive refutation
> of the Lucas/Penrose arguments that use Godel's theorem to "show" that human
> beings are not computational (or more precisely, to "show" that human beings
> are not computationally simulable)?
> 
> Just to refresh your memory, the argument goes like this: if I were a
> particular Turing Machine T, there would be a mathematical sentence G (the
> "Godel sentence" of T) that I could not prove.  But in fact I can see that G
> must be true.  Therefore I cannot be T.  This holds for all T, therefore I am
> not a Turing machine.

Godel only dealt with first order logic.  We presume that there is more
going on in the Universe than that.

Secondly, Godel published ``Uber formal unentscheidbare Satze der
Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, Tiel I'', in Monatshefte
fur Mathematik und Physik 38 (1931), 173-89. (umlauts omitted). He
then became ill and never published ``Teil II''.


Gordon Joly                                       +44 71 387 7050 ext 3716
Internet: G.Joly@cs.ucl.ac.uk          UUCP: ...!{uunet,ukc}!ucl-cs!G.Joly
Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, LONDON WC1E 6BT

           Email: Les jeux sans frontiers du monde