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From: brunnstein@rz.informatik.uni-hamburg.dbp.de (Klaus Brunnstein)
Newsgroups: comp.virus
Subject: (No) Viruses in Irak's EXOCET?
Message-ID: <0013.9101151325.AA04099@ubu.cert.sei.cmu.edu>
Date: 15 Jan 91 10:23:00 GMT
Sender: Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Lines: 94
Approved: krvw@sei.cmu.edu

French press (La Liberation) and media reported (Jan.10) in  some
details that computer viruses could be planted, either in advance
or  afterwards,  in  French  EXOCET rockets  to  influence  their
performance such as to misguide them.  Following a report of  the
German Press Agency (dpa),  German media (on Jan.11) were full of
reports about "viruses in Hussein's rockets".  According to  dpa,
(unnamed) French computer scientists said:

   - manufacturers of war material  usually  implant,  "for  mere
     commercial reasons",  viruses in exported war electronics to
     provoke,  after  some time,  faults and  "profitable  repair
     work";

   - though  Irakian weapon computers are  "hermetically  cut-off
     from the outside world", computer viruses could be implanted
     e.g. via "weather data";

   - moreover,  the built-in computers contain programs which may
     be triggered remotely;  the control system of (French-built)
     EXOCET rockets could be switched-off from French ships;  the
     only  problem  would be the mass of weapon computers  to  be
     switched-off simultaneously.


As usual in events related to malicious code,  truth is mixed  up
with misunderstandings, errors and impossibilities:

   - the implementation of weapon software makes self-reproducing
     programs (=viruses) impossible;  moreover,   it is very  im-
     probable, that such systems may be (re-)programmed remotely;
     French "experts" with such arguments are non-trustable;

   - on  the other hand,  other aspects of "malicious  code"  may
     well  be present in weapon computers;  at least in the  test
     phase,  rockets  can  be  destroyed by  triggering  a  self-
     destruction system remotely;  following the well-established
     principle "never change a running program", such "backdoors"
     (the  proper  name for this type of  malicious  code)  could
     survive the test version;

   - moreover,  French  system analysis might well have  foreseen
     scenarios  in  which to defend against  French-made  rockets
     (e.g. EXOCETS); French warships might remotely influence the
     EXOCET  control  systems if this remains  unchanged  by  the
     (Irakian) users of such technology;  with equivalent probab-
     ility,  other  Western weapon control systems could  contain
     similar self-protection mechanisms  (e.g.  US' Hawk missiles
     having been captured in Kuweit) ;

   - finally,  it is well-published (even in non-military period-
     icals)  that  and how electronic countermeasures  (ECM)  may
     mislead weapon electronics.


Some interesting questions following from such "possibilities":

   - May Irak detect, influence or adapt such weapon software? As
     software  technology  is not well-enough developed  in  Irak
     (and most part of the Arab world),  they probably must  rely
     on  foreign experts (as they evidently do in  other  Hi-Tech
     areas).

   - If French EXOCET rockets are remotely controllable:  why did
     the  French  not warn their "friends"  who  suffered  severe
     losses through their weaponry (e.g.  UK in Falkland  crisis,
     or US in the Iran crisis,  see accident of USS  STARK)?  Did
     they  at least now warn and properly equip their  allies  in
     the Arabian desert?

For  "RISK  experienced"  experts,  it  is  not  surprising  that
misinformation  lives best in threatening situations (such as  at
the Gulf);  apart from general attitudes of  newsmedia,  computer
scientists  who  nominate their  technological  constructs  (e.g.
"self-reproducing   programs")  in  such  inadequate   terms   as
"viruses" (see also:  "intelligence" etc) are highly  responsible
for misinterpretation and misunderstanding by less well  informed
media people and the public!  On the other side,  authorities and
the  public only in such threatening circumstances become   aware
of riskful assumptions inherent in contemporary computer systems.
Such unfortunate experience may lead to the cynic assumption that
risks may best be conceived by (hopefully:  moderately) "ex post"
experiencing  them,  rather than analysing and avoiding them  "ex
ante".


Postscriptum:  computer "viruses" may nevertheless play a role in
"Operation Desert Shield".  There are (yet unconfirmed) news that
several  thousands  PCs (5000?) have been  infected  by  ordinary
"computer viruses".  This would not be a surprising experience as
the  soldiers  had to "vaste" ample waiting for  Jan.15;  in  the
absence of other possibilities for spending free  time,  computer
games (usually a source of "virus" infections) may have played  a
major  psychological  role,  maybe  with  some  impact  on  their
"ordinary functional behaviour".