Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!julius.cs.uiuc.edu!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!cbnewsj!cbnewsi!cbnewsh!cbnewse!cbnewsd!cbfsb!cbnewsc!cbnews!cbnews!military From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Sealift for Desert Shield Keywords: war sealift ships desert shield Message-ID: <1991Jan16.013547.10502@cbnews.att.com> Date: 16 Jan 91 01:35:47 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories Lines: 99 Approved: military@att.att.com From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold) To supply the current force level in the Gulf for combat operations will require 100 to 150 shiploads of dry cargo per month, plus 10 to 15 tankers per month (yes, really - to meet naval and aircraft fuel needs). This breaks down to the arrival of 25 to 30 cargo ships per day in SA to sustain combat operations. How many ships are needed to meet this requirement? Assume a trip (one-way) of approx. 6,000 miles (US to SA). The average speed of the ships would be about 10-15 knots per day, for a distance of about 360 nautical miles per day. The one-way trip would take about 17 days. Total transit time would be: Load in port of origin ......... 2 days Crossing to SA .................17 days Unloading in SA ................ 2 days Return trip ....................17 days --------- TOTAL 38 days For 30 arrivals per day, this would require 30 ships/day x 38 days = 1,140 ships I am ignoring the tanker problem, because currently there is a large surplus of tanker capacity worldwide; tanker capacity should not pose a problem. The question is, do we currently have the sealift capacity? Here are the figures I have: MSC nucleus ............ 58 MSC charter ............ 61 US Flag ................ 545 Ready Reserve ......... 32 ------ Subtotal .............. 696 These are the ships available right now, assuming the US can secure the services of all of the US flag cargo ships. One problem is that most of these ships are not break-bulk cargo ships, are container ships or RO/RO and not suitable for many types of military cargo. So where do we get the rest? US Control (flag of convenience) ....... 639 National Defense Reserve (2-3 months) .. 245 NATO allies ............................ 400 -------- 1,284 The grand total is 1,980, which should be adequate. However, the NDR fleet (245) is the "mothball" fleet, officially ready in 2 to 3 months, but no one really believes that (never mind the cost to rehab these ships). Most likely, the US will charter the needed bottoms from our NATO allies, the Japanese, Greeks, etc. and (except for maybe one or two) leave the NDR ships in mothballs. Incidentally, the NDR fleet are mostly Victory ships, not Liberty ships. Most of the Liberties have been broken up for scrap. The Victories are reported to be in reasonable condition; some were activated during Viet Nam. The bottom line is that our meager sealift capability is going to be strained if the fighting lasts for more than 60 days. Yet another good reason to get it over with quickly. We are also fortunate in that Saddam has no surface navy, submarine force, or long-range air force capable of interdicting shipping, so the convoys will sail unopposed; if we were to allow for, say, 10% losses for opposed crossings, then we would need to start with 33 ships in a convoy in order to deliver 30, and we would need to be able to replace the ships lost. Assuming losses of 3 ships per day, we would be able to sustain the sealift for at least 150 days. The base figures for tonnage needed is extrapolated from NATO requirements for a similar size force fighting Warsaw Pact forces. I have no recent information about port facilities in SA; the above assumes that there are adequate facilities to complete unloading of break-bulk cargo ships in 2 days. There are enough good harbors along the coast of SA and the Emirates, so this should not be a problem. They should be well- developed by now. In a protracted war, the port facilities become critical, and thus are attractive targets for sabotage and other attack by non-conventional forces (i.e., sappers, terrorists, commandos, etc). Anti-ship missiles like the Exocet can be used effectively against port facilities. Either attack the storage areas, or sink a few ships in the channel. I don't think the Scuds are accurate enough to use against ports with conventional warheads. All above data from unclassified public sources. Pat Kauffold AT&T Bell Labs Naperville, IL