Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!wuarchive!psuvax1!rutgers!aramis.rutgers.edu!athos.rutgers.edu!nanotech From: hibbert@xanadu.com (Chris Hibbert) Newsgroups: sci.nanotech Subject: Re: Is uploading suicide ? Keywords: uploading Message-ID: Date: 21 Jan 91 17:55:37 GMT Sender: nanotech@athos.rutgers.edu Organization: Xanadu Operating Company Lines: 30 Approved: nanotech@aramis.rutgers.edu John Papiewski asked why he would consider an uploaded version of himself or his friends to be the same person. You should really read Hans Moravec's book: "Mind Children." The particular scenario he postulates for uploading is that your brain is analyzed and simulated a layer at a time, and you get to try out each layer and decide if it's good enough before it gets destroyed in order to provide access to the next layer. The only technical ability you need to believe in is the ability to insert signals non-destructively at a depth greater than or equal to the depth at which you can non-destructively analyze the functionality and state. Given the size that our nano-agents will be compared to the size of neurons, that doesn't seem too hard. Now what you need to do is figure out why you won't trust a simulation of your brain when you can check each piece of it against the real thing as it's being put together. Remember the ship that was rebuilt one plank at a time? If all the pieces work the same, why won't it still be you? I'm not going to be first, but if my friends who upload first have the same personalities and behavior as they had before (to the best of my ability to tell) and report no loss of thinking skill, then I'll be willing as soon as I get tired of climbing rocks and playing volleyball in the unenhanced-human division. Chris