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From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: National Guard: Not ready or sandbagged?
Message-ID: <1991Feb9.031925.2933@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 9 Feb 91 03:19:25 GMT
References: <1991Feb7.015334.3310@cbnews.att.com>
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From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt)

> From drn@pinet.aip.org (donald_newcomb)
> 
>   There has been some recent play in the media about how the
> National Guard wasn't ready for war and had to be shipped off to
> Ft. Irwin to be trained before going to the PG. This has caused a
> great deal of reflection about the Total Force concept and how
> well it will apply in the future.  The old question, "Should the
> Regular Army be strengthened at the expense of the NG?," is being
> asked, once again.

  On one hand, recent Army editorials have pointed to the fact that
  some divisions deployed, not with their NG/RES roundout units but
  with an active duty brigade from somewhere else.  And they wondered
  just how effective is the 'round-out' concept.

  On the other hand, "had to be shipped off to Ft Irwin" because they
  weren't ready - rather it was a conscience decision to give them
  additional intense training before shipment.  (I guess that's not ready
  huh?)   
 
>   I can tell you that the higher-ups in the MS-NG were absolutely
> livid! The 155th Mechanized (1st Mississippi) Infantry scored higher
> than regular units in their readiness tests. They just got back from
> Ft. Irwin; what was it that the Army forgot to teach them when they
> were there?
>   There is a lot of historical, anecdotal evidence of the
> Regulars sandbagging the NG to prove that they can't do the job.

  I have had the opportunity to train, evaluate, and manuever with 
  National Guard and Reserve.  I put on a training exercise and evaluated
  a brigade of the Minnesota National Guard.  I was the senior evaluator
  of a California reserve battalion.  On a REFORGER in Germany, we had
  on our 'left flank' the Indiana NG (38th Division?).  In all my dealings
  I found the officers and men of the Guard and Reserve, dedicated, loyal,
  and professional in all respects.  They took pride in the readiness of
  their units and worked hard to maintain that readiness - often asking
  our (active) help in training.  Since they were 'round-out' to our
  units we had a vested interest in helping them maintain their readiness.
  
  I don't have any facts and figures - but I do have a sense that in many
  ways the Guard and Reserves are misrepresented - and their "readiness"
  is no more or worse than active duty "readiness".

  The real question is - how do you define "Readiness"?  But that, as they
  say, is a very complex topic - and can only be answered by someone who
  has actually prepared a "URR" (Unit Readiness Report - prepared monthly!).

  And THAT, I wouldn't want to start getting into - talk about "peaking".

  ----------------------------------

  This is what will determine "readiness" and "success" in battle:

             Equipment, Training, and Leadership



  mike schmitt

        "All soldiers must train for war.  All else is bullshit!"
                                    - General George S. Patton Jr