Xref: utzoo talk.politics.misc:63889 talk.politics.mideast:34113 trial.talk.politics.peace:45 alt.desert-storm:7814 Path: utzoo!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!sdd.hp.com!spool.mu.edu!snorkelwacker.mit.edu!shelby!neon!Neon!jmc From: jmc@DEC-Lite.Stanford.EDU (John McCarthy) Newsgroups: talk.politics.misc,talk.politics.mideast,trial.talk.politics.peace,alt.conspiracy,alt.desert-storm Subject: Re: The Nuclear Option Message-ID: Date: 15 Feb 91 23:52:44 GMT References: <1991Feb7.025838.13793@panix.uucp> <1991Feb9.075438.17779@alembic.acs.com> <1991Feb11.023449.17583@ddsw1.MCS.COM> <1991Feb11.172446.7039@engin.umich.edu> <1991Feb11.204302.27201@meteor.wisc.edu> <1991Feb12.1 Sender: news@Neon.Stanford.EDU (USENET News System) Organization: /u/jmc/.organization Lines: 13 In-Reply-To: alain@elevia.uucp's message of 14 Feb 91 16:54:46 GMT The main relevant book is entitled "The Japanese Decision to Surrender". I haven't read it, but I did read a biography of Emperor Hirohito, which described his decisive role in the decision. There had been some peace feelers that the Soviets had not passed on. A demonstration might have had the usual effect of a gradual escalation. A decision to fight on would have been easier after a demonstration. Then, when the bombing actually occurred it would have been a smaller step to decide to fight on anyway. But this is a diversion from my main point that the troops would have bitterly resented not using the bomb in the most effective way. Also remember that Truman had been an artillery captain in WWI.