Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!crdgw1!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!att!cbnews!cbnews!military From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Tempest report (eyes-only). Message-ID: <1991Feb12.020805.12052@cbnews.att.com> Date: 12 Feb 91 02:08:05 GMT References: <1991Feb9.034453.5301@cbnews.att.com> Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (William B. Thacker) Organization: The Instrumentality Lines: 31 Approved: military@att.att.com From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) In article <1991Feb9.034453.5301@cbnews.att.com> "Larry W. Jewell" writes: >This is actually no longer true. To snoop on a computer you need >a big antenna and a bunch of electronics. The Govt realized that >by simply preventing this through appropriate physical security >(ie Dont let big trucks with unknow drivers with antennas into your secure >compound :-)) >they could save a lot of money on this tempest stuff. Not all eavesdropping methods rely on antennas. It is possible to pick up the signal generated by a keyboard by wiretapping--and the wire does not necessarily have to be one that you intend to be transmitting a signal on. The book _Spycatcher_ describes, for example, how British intelligence cracked a French diplomatic code. The French had a teletype hooked to an encryption device, which then transmitted the encoded signal over a wire to its destination outside the embassy. The British tapped the wire, and were able to pick up the pulses from the teletype. Thus, they were able to intercept both coded and clear transmissions at once. -- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist. | Peter Cash | (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein) |cash@convex.com ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~