Path: utzoo!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!usc!samsung!noose.ecn.purdue.edu!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!sage.cc.purdue.edu!asg
From: asg@sage.cc.purdue.edu (Bruce Varney)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.internals
Subject: Re: rock-and-roll [Re: Retaining file permissions] [long]
Keywords: chmod, sed, awk... and good old *cat*!
Message-ID: <7431@mentor.cc.purdue.edu>
Date: 7 Mar 91 05:11:41 GMT
References: <7391@mentor.cc.purdue.edu> <1991Mar6.234727.23298@athena.mit.edu> <10710@dog.ee.lbl.gov>
Sender: news@mentor.cc.purdue.edu
Reply-To: asg@sage.cc.purdue.edu (Bruce Varney)
Distribution: usa
Organization: Purdue University
Lines: 49

In article <10710@dog.ee.lbl.gov> torek@elf.ee.lbl.gov (Chris Torek) writes:
>>In article <7391@mentor.cc.purdue.edu> asg@sage.cc.purdue.edu
>>(The Grand Master) writes:
>>> The following is a letter I mailed that our friend at MIT would not
>>> post for me (Our news poster was screwed up). ...
>
>In article <1991Mar6.234727.23298@athena.mit.edu> jik@athena.mit.edu
>(Jonathan I. Kamens) defends himself a bit.  I would like to add that I
>probably would not have posted that particular article for Mr. Master
>either (and how did you get a first name like `The' anyway? :-) ).
Read on and you would have found my real name. Our system has
a specification for a Real name, and a Nickname. Unfortunatly,
Pnews uses my Nickname instead of my Real name (My Nickname
obviously being "The Grand Master"). Since several people such
as yourself have found that too hard to comprehend, I have changed
my "Nickname" to my real name. Happy? :-)
>
>As it happens, this particular barn door was closed after a horse had
>escaped.  There is no sense in arguing that `write not clearing set-id
>could not possibly be a security problem', because it was.  One could
>perhaps argue that `it is not now a security problem', but I would not
>want to bet my systems on it.

My contention is that it is no longer necessary to clear the suid
bit on NON-EXECUTABLE FILES! Jon put forth that non-executables had
had the suid bit clear to prevent security violations. I merely suggest
that this is not the case, but that the reason this behavior still
exists is because it would be a time and resource consuming to 
modify the kernal to check if the file had an execute bit set before
deciding to clear the suid.

>-- 
>In-Real-Life: Chris Torek, Lawrence Berkeley Lab EE div (+1 415 486 5427)
>Berkeley, CA		Domain:	torek@ee.lbl.gov

---------
sar.casm \'sa:r-.kaz-*m\ \sa:r-'kas-tik\ \-ti-k(*-)le-\ n [F sarcasme, fr. 
   LL sarcasmos, fr. Gk sarkasmos, fr. sarkazein to tear flesh, bite the lips 
   in rage, sneer, fr. sark-, sarx flesh; akin to Av thwar*s to cut] 1: a 
   cutting, hostile, or contemptuous remark : GIBE 2: the use of caustic or 
   ironic language - sar.cas.tic aj

                                   ###             ##
Courtesy of Bruce Varney           ###               #
aka -> The Grand Master                               #
asg@sage.cc.purdue.edu             ###    #####       #
PUCC                               ###                #
;-)                                 #                #
;'>                                #               ##