Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wuarchive!usc!isi.edu!smoliar
From: smoliar@isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: toward a definition of AI
Message-ID: <17084@venera.isi.edu>
Date: 10 Mar 91 23:47:46 GMT
References: <13477@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU>
Reply-To: smoliar@venera.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar)
Organization: Information Sciences Institute, Univ. of So. California
Lines: 84

In article <13477@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU> news@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU (USENET News)
writes:
>`AI' is a very difficult term to describe to the layman, perhaps even more so
>than other scientific terms, because there is not even total agreement within
>the field itself on its goals.  However, AI researchers might agree,
> 
>``The mind is a machine.''
> 
>* Notice I said `mind' and not `brain'.  Otherwise the statement would not be
>  scientifically controversial (or, in other words, the claim would not be
>  worth investigating in the same way that the statement ``atoms exist'' is
>  not).
> 
>* Notice I said `machine'.  This should be taken in a completely general way.
>  It should not evoke any visions of turning gears or intricate chips.
>  Anything that can be physically isolated constitutes a machine.
> 
>* By `is', I mean that the mind can be `completely described' in terms of
>  mechanics.  The test is whether we can use the entities (namely `minds'
>  and `machines') interchangeably.
> 
I guess I want to go on record as one AI researcher who is no rush to agree
with the above statement, even in light of the meticulous elaborations.  As a
matter of fact, I try to talk about "mind" as little as possible, because it
gives me so much trouble whenever I try to engage it as a well-formed piece of
terminology.  I am certainly willing to argue that the BODY is a machine,
complete with the elaboration of "machine" stated above.  However, I find
that my plate is full enough if I try to address why it is that the human
body behaves the way it does (and do so in a manner consistent with the
assumption that it is a machine), that I am too busy to worry about where
"mind" comes into the picture and will be perfectly happy to let philosophers
argue about that word after I have achieved a few respectable concrete results!

By the way, I think this whole matter is useful for putting the recent debate
between Searle and the Churchlands into perspective.  Consider the following
formulation of an "AI" question:

	Can we analyse the behavior of a human body as if it were a
	machine to the extent that the resulting mechanics would account
	for those aspects of its behavior which we choose to call
	"intelligent?"

This is sort of an attempt to inch forward from Turing's initial approach.
Turing was perfectly willing to leave the term "intelligence" to philosophers
and focus on the behavior required to play his Imitation Game.  This question
basically proposes to push the boundaries of behavior from the Imitation Game
out to more general matters of getting on in the world.

Ultimately, the Churchlands claim that this question can be answered in the
affirmative.  The crux of their argument is that we can build intelligent
machines because the human body is such a machine.  Therefore, whatever we
need to know about intelligent behavior should be deducible from an analysis
of the appropriate mechanics.

Searle, on the other hand, is saying that there must be more to human behavior
than any sort of mechanical analysis.  What is that "more?"  Well, that's where
all the controversy lies.  Searle seems to be part of a long line of
philosophers, beginning with Brentano, who firmly believe that such
a "more" exists but have not gotten much further than giving it a name:
intentionality.  The whole point of the Chinese Room argument is not so
much to dump on artificial intelligence as to demonstrate that machines
are fundamentally incapable of having intentionality.  Given that
"intentionality" is about as elusive a piece of terminology as "intelligence"
(or Searle's favorite, "understanding"), Searle's arguments have more to do
with intimidation than with deduction.

Personally, I cannot understand why this controversy has attracted so much
fuss.  There is so much to be done by way of implementing convincing behavior
in even the most limited set of circumstances that it hardly seems worthwhile
to dwell on whether or not such behavior is REALLY intelligent.  Of course, if
one of the intentionality experts could come up with an argument as to why a
lack of intentionality would impede ever implementing that behavior, those of
us who "do" artificial intelligence would certainly be obliged to listen.  That
would be like discovering that there is no need to waste any more effort on
developing a technique to trisect an angle with straight edge and compass.
However, such a powerful argument has not yet been presented;  and because,
in my own humble opinion, "intentionality" is too slippery a word to even be
dignified with the sobriquet of "concept," I am not going to hold my breath
waiting for it.
-- 
USPS:	Stephen Smoliar
	5000 Centinela Avenue  #129
	Los Angeles, California  90066
Internet:  smoliar@venera.isi.edu