Path: utzoo!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!gatech!purdue!ccncsu!debussy!petersja
From: petersja@debussy.cs.colostate.edu (james peterson)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: What does intentionality have that AI doesn't.....
Message-ID: <13503@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU>
Date: 13 Mar 91 22:57:40 GMT
Sender: news@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU
Organization: Colorado State Computer Science Department
Lines: 56


In article <17107@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@venera.isi.edu (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
>However, we are still
>left with this awkward position that the inadequacy of symbol manipulating
>machines lies in this lack of intentionality.  In other words we must now
>confront the question of what qualities a machine must possess to allow it
>to have intentionality.  Saying it has to be more than a symbol manipulator
>is not enough.  It is still necessary to be able to look at a machine, analyze
>it, and conclude from that analysis whether or not it has intentionality.  

This is the second time Stephen has recently requested clues as to what is so
special about intentionality.  The first time he asked if "one of the
intentionality experts could come up with an argument as to why a lack of
intentionality would impede ever implementing [intelligent] behavior...."

I certainly don't wish to claim being an intentionality expert, and I don't
have an "argument" to offer in the sense intended here, but I have a suggestion
as to what is so special about intentionality that I beleive to be at least
consistent with Searle.  In any case, it may prompt some discussion of
something I take to be important. 

What it is about "intentionality" the lack of which would impede the 
implementation of intelligent behavior artificially is related to the
problem of "relevance."  How is it that intelligent creatures are capable
of selecting from their manifold inputs that portion which will be considered 
as important, and that which is to be ignored?  How is it, moreover, that
intelligent creatures are able to assign relative values to parts of
the environment related to importance, and readjust these relative values
as they procede?

Frames and scripts, it seems to me, gloss over this difficulty by assigning
relevance in advance.  The hard problem is to account for how relevance
comes about in the first place, and how it develops...

What makes assignments of relevance possible on an ongoing basis is 
*motivation* --- things, parts of the environment, are relevant, important, or
interesting precisely in the context of some *purpose* (if my purposes change,
so does what is relevant); relevance is thus a function of our
reasons (or motives) for acting...  Humans act for reasons, but for 
reasons which do not compel or necessitate (reasons are not causes); being
free to act according to one's own plans, plans of one's own authorship,
and to change those plans on an on-going and flexible manner is what
I believe intentionality has that is needed to implement intelligence.  Searle
says that intentionality and intelligence are tied to "causal powers" --
and this is what I take him to mean -- the ability to cause actions for
reasons independent of nature's causal nexus, in a word, motivation.

Excuse me if I have been less than clear, I did not have much time to
trot this out......


-- 
james lee peterson				petersja@CS.ColoState.edu
dept. of computer science                       
colorado state university		"Some ignorance is invincible."
ft. collins, colorado  (voice:303/491-7137; fax:303/491-2293)