Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: utzoo!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo
From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: What does intentionality have that AI doesn't.....
Message-ID: <1991Mar14.191814.26802@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <13503@ccncsu.ColoState.EDU> <1991Mar14.150044.12197@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 1991 19:18:14 GMT

In article <1991Mar14.150044.12197@watdragon.waterloo.edu> cpshelley@violet.uwaterloo.ca (cameron shelley) writes:
>
>If I can inject a tangential remark here, we should be aware of a traditional
>division of vocabulary on this issue, namely that between *intention* and
>*intension*.
>
>Intention is related to "intent" and usually refers to a predisposition
>to some action or view.  In this sense, any program has intention --- it
>is created to fulfil a specific purpose normally in a specific manner.
>
>Intension is related to "intense" and usually means whatever the author
>wants it to, but in this context it refers to "the content of a notion",
>or let's say "the meaning of an intention".  In philosophy (so far as I
>can tell), it also denotes "the ability to form intentions" plus some
>intangible spin.  Call it "motivation" or "purpose" if you like.
>
I really don't like the tone of what I'm about to say but you've got this
entirely wrong. IntenTionality, in philosophy, indicates the capacity of 
some entity to point to or refer to something else. Thoughts (inasmuch
as they're propositional attitudes) refer in this way. So do sentences
and, sometimes, pictures, although their intentionality seems to be 
derived from ours -- we use them that way.  Intent, as the term is used
colloquially (e.g., "I intend to go to the movies") is not at issue. It
is only a species of the tehcnical form of IntenTionality and not priveledged
in any particular way.

IntenSion is an entirely different matter. To put things crudely, the 
IntenSion of a mental act (Brentano's term) is its representation (or
'mental picture', sometimes) 'in your head'. This is to be contrasted
with the extension of the act, the thing in the world which is being
represented. There has long been a debate in philosophy over which
(the intension or the extension) is the MEANING. Hilary Putnam is
particularly notable for having argued the latter. Jerry Fodor has
severely criticized Putnam's position.

I hate to be so blunt and I hope this won't be construed as a flame but
it is important to get these terms straight before engaging in any further
debate on this topic. (Incedentally, a similar discussion is going on
over in sci.philosophy.tech. I wonder how much overlap in readership 
there is between these two. Perhaps we can link the two discussions up?)


-- 
Christopher D. Green
Psychology Department                             e-mail:
University of Toronto                   christo@psych.toronto.edu
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1                cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca