Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!usc!sdd.hp.com!caen!uwm.edu!linac!att!cbnews!cbnews!military From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: The F-111 tragicomedy (was Re: B2 vs. F117A) Summary: Cluster-**** Message-ID: <1991Feb28.050855.8085@cbnews.att.com> Date: 28 Feb 91 05:08:55 GMT References: <1991Feb26.011655.5357@cbnews.att.com> Sender: military@cbnews.att.com (william.b.thacker) Organization: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory - Berkeley, CA, USA Lines: 76 Approved: military@att.att.com From: jtchew@csa2.lbl.gov (JOSEPH T CHEW) A longish posting, begging Bill's indulgence. Mary Shafer asked, >>Why did we buy so many B-52s when we could have bought F-111s? then corrected herself, >Obviously, I misspoke here, since the B-52 production run ended >in 62, before the F-111 flew. True. The F-111 was in flight test in 1965, along about the time the B-52s first went to war -- and three years after the B-52 plant closed. >I should have written something like: >Why did we keep our B-52s once we got F-111s? >or >Why did we get F-111s when we could have bought more cheap B-52s? Well, there was the thought of using the FB-111 to replace the older B-52s (more on this below). But the B-52s would not have been so cheap after the line had been shut down -- and nobody had any idea how expensive the F-111 would be. The story of the TFX/F-111 project (Tactical Fighter Experimental) is a monumental comedy of errors. I suspect that a full retelling is beyond the tolerance of our moderator, especially since two books on the subject are available readily enough. Here's the gist of it. In this context, the key point is that the TFX originated with a TAC requirement (significantly, not SAC) for the logical successor to the F-105. In other words, a tactical bomber for the nuclear- strike mission at fairly short range (combat radius 540 nm for this mission profile, though capable of ferrying across the Atlantic at best-range speed). Fair enough. But they also wanted to make an air-superiority fighter (by the standards of the day -- high Mach at high altitude, and why maneuver when you've got this super radar?). And it was supposed to be usable by the Navy, too. The requirements piled up, many of them (as we can see today) damn near mutually exclusive, and some of them, such as preferring low-level supersonic penetration over even lower-level subsonic, not even very good ideas. In other words, they tried to make it all things for all people, and they were lucky to end up with anything for anybody. One of the stated goals for the FB-111A, a plane announced in 1965 and somewhat resembling the soon-to-be cancelled Navy F-111B (better than "General Hospital," eh?), was replacement of the B-52C through F. Some say that this announcement was just a political move to bury the already enormous and still growing cost of this managerially hamburgered program. Some 76 of the 450 or so F-111s were FB-111s. The story of this multi-billion-dollar pratfall is told in detail in Coulam, Robert F., "Illusions of choice: the F-111 and the problem of weapons acquisition reform," Princeton University Press (1977). This is a formidable yet readable treatment of all aspects of the project; you'll learn about management theory and practice as well as engine/ inlet mismatches and stress cracks. He offers abundant references in case you're doing a paper in business administration or military science or somesuch, or just want to read the original sources. It's kind of a sick story, but a compelling one. Unfortunately, one of the key lessons -- that avalanches of reports and office complexes full of overseers don't ensure success -- was at best half-learned and certainly was not propagated and generalized throughout the government. But I digress... Another book I have yet to dig up (referred to extensively in Coulam's footnotes) is Art, Robert J., "The TFX decision: McNamara and the military," Little, Brown (1968). --Joe "Just another personal opinion from the People's Republic of Berkeley"