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From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Changes to the Reserves.
Message-ID: <1991Mar19.045253.10213@cbnews.att.com>
Date: 19 Mar 91 04:52:53 GMT
References: <1991Mar18.003926.23568@cbnews.att.com>
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From: cga66@ihlpy.att.com (Patrick V Kauffold)
> From: bcstec!shuksan!major@uunet.UU.NET (Mike Schmitt)
> 
>   SecDef Cheney has stated that the "round-out" concept of a reserve
>   component combat brigade 'assigned' as the third brigade of an active
>   division, simply did not work as planned.  Training and the NTC uncovered
>   some serious deficiencies in combat readiness.  No reserve component 
>   combat units were deployed to the Gulf.  Active divisions that are tabbed
>   for 'rapid-deployment' to trouble spots must be complete divisions.
>   Reserve component combat brigades may be formed into divisions for follow-on
>   deployments.  

Right - the deployment uncovered some serious gaps between readiness which
was REPORTED pre-war, and what they were actually capable of doing.  The
most serious deficiencies I have seen in some reports point the finger at
the leadership.  Whether this invalidates the round-out aspect of "Total
Force" remains to be seen.

There have been reports that the Reserve units deployed performed very well,
and in many cases performed near miracles.  Note that the logistics effort
leaned heavily on reserves.

No reserve component combat units?  You must mean only Army; there were
a number of Air Force reserve units in combat, as well as Coast Guard
and Navy.


>   Reserve components will see about a 20% loss in authorized personnel.

This was already in the mill before the war.  ROA is fighting this.  Both
sides will claim that the Gulf War has validated their respective positions.
My guess is more like a 10% reduction over 5 years.

>   Strategic Sealift is to be boosted with an increase in the Ready Reserve
>   Fleet.  Airlift, however, will remain at current levels. (Well, they won't
>   have that much to carry will they?) 

Still two big problems with the sealift: it isn't a necessity in peacetime,
and the Navy doesn't like spending money for grubby cargo ships and tankers
instead of glamorous carriers and submarines.  Just to move a bunch of stuff
for the Army and Marine Corps?  And you don't get promoted by being the CO
of an AUXILIARY.  Junkyard Navy.  

Sealift has a real image problem.  It may get a more serious look, but with
the budget axe flying, this sector will be hard pressed to get any of those
declining dollars.

To boot, the Air Force will be glad to promise that it will be able to 
deliver the goods, just give us more C-17, C-whatever.  Airlift proponents
have a product they believe in.