Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!igor!rutabaga!wab From: wab@rutabaga.Rational.COM (Bill Baker) Newsgroups: sci.space.shuttle Subject: Re: MANY QUESTIONS (Shuttle cabin survival) Message-ID: <953@igor.Rational.COM> Date: 25 Mar 91 22:47:02 GMT References: <8097@crash.cts.com> <940@igor.Rational.COM> <1991Mar23.094700.14237@cimage.com> Sender: news@Rational.COM Organization: Joan Vollmer Womens Academy Lines: 37 In article <1991Mar23.094700.14237@cimage.com> gregc@dgsi.UUCP (Greg Cronau/10000) writes: >In article <940@igor.Rational.COM> wab@eclipse.Rational.COM (Bill Baker) writes: >>I'm sure that on the first shuttle launch Truly was thinking to >>himself, "The hell with the ejection seats. If the shit hits the fan, >>I'm shutting down the computers and putting this baby down by the seat >>of my pants." So instead of thinking of the crew cabin as a > >I've got 2 little problems with this: >1.) If Truly was on the first shuttle mission, he was hiding somewhere in >the equipment bay. The first mission was Young/Crippen. I post two long pieces on the shuttle survival system and almost the only response is, "It wasn't Truly it was Crippen." Alright, it was Crippen! Jeez.... >2.) If you shut down the computers, then you had better eject, because you >are flying a *rock* at that point! Without the computers, there's no way >to get the signals from the pilots controls to the control surfaces! > >gregc@cimage.com Same thing. If it makes the nitpickers happy, substitute the word "overriding" for the phrase "shutting down." The intent was perfectly clear. For God's sake, I hope the future of the net isn't typical of this useless pedantery. I still say that NASA is shooting itself in the foot with no real crew survival system. Their rationale, and this applies to a lot of other shuttle systems as well, is that the likelihood of failure over time isn't worth the trouble. Yet this argument assumes a low number of flights annually. Fewer flights=less risk of failure over the lifetime of the shuttle program. More flights=greater risk. So essentially NASA is betting that shuttle use *won't* increase; it's betting against its own favorite launch system and predicating a lot of design features on that assumption. Isn't NASA supposed to be ambitious? Even with a new heavy lifter, construction and maintenance of the Space Station, a Mars mission, shuttle repair/retrieval of satellites, launching probes, various science missions, all add up to more than ten flights a year over the next 30 years. Either NASA's being pessimitic about how often the shuttle will fly or else cavalier with the lives of astronauts.