Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!swrinde!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!newstop!sun!amdcad!amdcad!military From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: How effective was the Stealth fighter? Message-ID: <1991Apr13.015047.23214@amd.com> Date: 12 Apr 91 12:41:02 GMT References: <1991Apr9.025945.1283@amd.com> <1991Apr12.055301.14403@amd.com> Sender: military@amd.com Organization: David Taylor Research Center, Bethesda, MD Lines: 77 Approved: military@amd.com From: swilliam@oasys.dt.navy.mil (Steve Williams) > All I am asking is whether anyone knows of other measures that can > be used to quantify how well Stealth worked in this war .... I am > asking for some decent data that supports the fact that it can accomplish > this mission. Military speaking, you need to deliver the "knock-out punch" to start the war, using the element of surprise. Japan achieved the element of surprise in their Pearl Harbor attack, resulting in maximum damage to our bases and ships with minimum loss to its attacking planes. The Steath fighters did exactly the same thing. They slipped inside the Iraqi defense undetected and delivered the knock-out punch to their military communication center which seriously impaired Iraq's ability to defend itself. This was the Steath fighter's most valuable contribution in the Gulf War. > The Iraqi air defenses either ran away or proved ineffective. The Iraqi air defenses didn't run away. Because of the loss of Iraq's military communication center, everything was in chaos for the Iraqi defenders. Hence, the Iraqi defense was ineffective. > The Iraqi ground troops were easily routed. For the same reason. Because Iraq lost the military communication center, Iraq never utilized its ground troops effectively. > If in fact Stealth technology worked well and paved the way for our > air victory, then all I am asking for is a discussion of what evidence > there is to say that this was the only technology that could have done > this job. Knocking out Iraq's military communication center was probably the most critical thing that the allied forces had to do. Other types of planes (non-steath planes) might have done the job, but the cost certainly would have been much higher (in number of planes lost) and it would have taken longer to do it (in number of attempted attacks), involving more attack planes just for one target. The Steath fighter's knocking out the military communication center using the "smart" bomb "guaranteed" the collapse of the entire Iraqi defense. If another type of plane was used for this attack, the Iraqi air defenders would have been alerted, and the attack possibly would fail. > ... Stealth does not clearly stand out from the crowd in survivability. Most likely true. > It is possible that Stealth also showed up on the Iraqi radar ... Who knows? If so, then why didn't Iraq react? Beside, Iraq was in a dilemma. Leaving the radars on will subject the Iraqi radar stations to anti-radar missile attacks. Leaving the radar off will leave the Iraqi defenders blind. Consequently, the Iraqi defenders risked switching their radars on whenever they suspected that enemy planes were coming in and leaving them off other times (which was most of the time). Really, a hopeless situation for the Iraqi air defenders. The loss of the communication center didn't help (the communication center might have gotten info from other units that enemy planes were on their way to Baghdad, for example). > ... and there were other reasons that the Iraqi's were unable to knock > these aircraft out. What other reasons? With the radars turned off most of the time, it was a piece of cake for the Steath fighters operating in nights. [Remember everyone, sci.military's charter is *technical*, lets not drift into general discussions; those should go to alt.desert-storm. This article is pushing it. --CDR]