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From: law@sievax.enet.dec.com (Mathew Law)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Conciousness
Message-ID: <1991Apr18.165045.13932@hollie.rdg.dec.com>
Date: 18 Apr 91 16:50:45 GMT
References: <1991Apr16.061532.10775@panix.uucp> <1991Apr16.232600.10977@watserv1.waterloo.edu>
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Reply-To: law@sievax.enet.dec.com (Mathew Law)
Organization: Digital Equipment Company, Reading, UK
Lines: 102

In article <1991Apr16.232600.10977@watserv1.waterloo.edu>,
ssingh@watserv1.waterloo.edu ( Ice ) writes:
>
>These machines are formal systems... and they are finite state
>machines...
>as such, they can assume a certain number of states. We can very
>broadly
>define _mind_ for any finite state machine as the set of states that
>it
>can assume. A 386 PC is has a more powerful mind than an HP calculator
>because it can assume a larger number of states. But depending on how
>it is programmed, it may or may not exhibit intelligence.

Agreed (mostly).  A reasonable definition of mind for a finite 
state machine.  Is a brain a finite machine?  What definition of
intelligence are you using?

>One property of intelligence is having a model of the outside world
>consistent
>with reality. This means that the states of the machine are in some
>way
>isomorphic to the outside world...

Don't agree.  Intelligence doesn't *require* a model of the outside 
world consistent with reality, and having such a model does not 
impart intelligence.  It is true, however, to say that many measures
of intelligence are based on having such a world model (e.g. Turing 
test).

>But the machine need not be _self-conscious_ for this to happen...
>Self-
>consciousness arises when the machine is also able to have an abstract
>model of itself somewhere in its set of states.

Is this the only requirement for self-consciousness?  What does this 
abstract model consist of?  Surely there is also the requirement 
for a program(?) that is able to use this information in a particular 
way.
 
>That presumably requires that certain requirements be met...
>
>i) Perceptual devices to link to the outside world. A self-model
>cannot
>exist _AT_ALL_ without this, however powerful ii) is...
>
>ii) A _LARGE_ # of states. How large? I don't know. Wish I did.
>

Why are these perceptual devices required?  By this argument, 
would you say that a human brain which suddenly had all its 
stimuli removed would no longer be intelligent?  If so, would 
intelligence return when stimuli returned?  Would the argument 
be different for a human brain that had no stimuli from birth?

>>Has any research been done on programs that are concious, that is have
>>>awareness of the world and of themselves? Also there is the problem
>of 
>>infinite recursion because if something is aware of itself, it is also
>>>aware of itself being aware of itself etc.. 
>
>Read Hofstadter's _Godel,Escher,Bach_ : Classic advice :-). Personally,
>my
>guess is that finite state machines can achieve a sense of
>self-awareness,
>but not a perfect one for exactly that reason. 
>
>If your brain had the capacity for modelling itself to inifinite
>precision
>but only a finite computing speed, you'd go into a trance and never
>exit
>it if you tried to introspect. In order for you to be able to achieve
>a perfect model of yourself, you would have to have an infinite
>computing speed as well, and neurons are _slow_. You could perhaps
>achieve infinite computing speed with an infinite number of neurons
>but
>that is not realizable either...
>

But is a perfect self-model required for perfect self-consciousness 
any more than perfect sight would require that you could see atoms?

>So I conclude that we can have at best a reasonably accurate model of
>ourselves, but never a perfect one. There are limits to 
>"computational resolution." (My chance for a question: Is this why we
>have
>a subconscious, stuff happening below the conscious level, because of
>introspective limits?)
>

My opinion:  self-consciousness is not the same as self model.

Any comments?  If I'm being stupid, then please E-mail me before
posting!  
Sorry for all the questions - I hope you can tell which ones are because
I disagree, and which are because I genuinely don't have an answer...

--
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| Mat. | law@sievax.enet.dec.com | Mathew B. Law.  (Contractor)       |
| *:o) | Tel: +44 734 853273     | Digital Equipment Co., Reading, UK |
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     The above is quite probably rubbish.  Blame me, not Digital.