Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!usc!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!mips!pacbell.com!pacbell!ptsfa!dmturne From: dmturne@PacBell.COM (Dave Turner) Newsgroups: comp.dcom.modems Subject: Re: Modem backdoor passwords (was re: security functions) Message-ID: <6101@ptsfa.PacBell.COM> Date: 19 Apr 91 23:38:04 GMT References: <1991Apr10.150745.4628@sctc.com> <1991Apr15.155157.19473@cimage.com> <21400047@bfmny0.BFM.COM> Reply-To: dmturne@PacBell.COM (Dave Turner) Organization: Pacific * Bell, San Ramon, CA Lines: 21 In article <21400047@bfmny0.BFM.COM> tneff@bfmny0.BFM.COM (Tom Neff) writes: >If and when Caller*ID becomes universally available, it might be >superior to callback for modem security. If the caller's number isn't >on your approved list, don't accept the login. (Further, only accept >certain classes of login based on the caller number's security >classification, etc.) > I may be wrong but I believe that call forwarding will defeat both dialback modems and Caller*ID screening. In the case of dialback modems, the approved dialback number may have call forwarding (possibly installed illegally) so that a badguy really receives the call. Unless Caller*ID displays the original calling number and not the forwarding number, screening will fail. -- Dave Turner 415/823-2001 {att,bellcore,sun,ames,decwrl}!pacbell!dmturne