Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!mips!cs.uoregon.edu!ogicse!intelhf!ichips!iwarp.intel.com!gargoyle!learn From: learn@gargoyle.uchicago.edu (William Vajk ) Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Re: Amendments Message-ID: <1487@gargoyle.uchicago.edu> Date: 20 Apr 91 20:30:33 GMT References: <1475@gargoyle.uchicago.edu> Organization: Dares No Organization Like Dis Organization Lines: 98 In article Scott Stanton writes: >Could you clarify this? I'm afraid I missed the reference. My reference was to what became mission impossible, the ERA. >I don't think licensing computing devices makes any sense, either. >But there is a difference between stating that it makes no sense to >license and stating that the use is a right. I would contend that a >lot of computing does use public resources. Electricity is an obvious >example. In many cases, the phone lines are another. These aren't public resources. They are (1) energy for sale by proucers and (2) Lease of telecommunications facilities, rental by the minute as in my case at this particular moment. The telephone is not a requirement to computer use, though that is in many instances an enhancement. But you're still sidestepping the crucial element in all this. So far, you've admitted that "it doesn't make sense" to license computer use. It doesn't indeed. And yet you're not willing to accord use of a computer the same status as creating light for oneself after dark, or any other of a million things we do and take for granted. A computer happens to be the latest gadget. Do you believe you have a right to create light after dark ? Do you believe you can use other technological gadgets as a "right" ? Maybe like a blender, or a microwave, or a gas range ? Or is there something inherent in "devices" and "gadgets" that subjects them to potential for license ? As a practical matter, we sort of "know" what is allowed in modern society, and what isn't. One of the issues raised in the Neidorf proceedings had to do with the understanding and interpretation, in legal terms, of the bits and bytes going down a wire. One of the real difficulties I have with the Judge's finding on a motion is that for all practical purposes, he made the computer (extended as it is via modems, phone lines, and coax) invisible and concerned himself only with cause and effect. In this example, someone sent illegally obtained text at one end, and Neidorf received it at the other. The critical aspect had to do with sending taking place in one state, and the receipt in another. This made it interstate transport, and the medium of transport was not to be considered part of the equation. One might callously assign the same value to the computer system as a pumpkin (one must know a little history to have this statement make any sense.) Yet specific criminality is associated, by the government, with the use of this invisible device caalled a computer, extended variety called a computer network. And they've been running around the countryside seizing these 'invisible pumpkins.' (And as sort of a humorous aside, how much trouble would today's law enforcement take to create a strong enough relationship to seize that entire farm as a 'vehicle' of criminality.) > My main point is that details like this don't belong in the Constitution. The things that end up in the Constitution are those issues with widely scattered and widely based ramifications. I haven't yet suggested what form of an ammendment I might propose. I think it a bit presumptious of anyone to arbitrarily decide against something so undefined as 'an ammendment which would include computers.' >The principles are invariant over time even when the details are not. It >is impossible to apply the Constitution without some context. The >Supreme Court is there to provide that context. The changing >interpretations of the Constitution reflect the changing contexts in >which it must be interpreted. If we put too much context into the >Constitution, it will become brittle and break. By this I mean that >we will lose sight of the principles and become bogged down in details >that may no longer be relevant. This is what I was referring to when >I pointed out the Texas constitution. I am not picking on you personally Scott, with what I am about to say. But this is unadulterated BS. The Supreme Court, it has jokingly been said, first renders a decision, and then digs through the Constitution as well as anything else it can muster to support the verdict. It probably is more true than funny. If the Constitution were quite the tool you claim it is, then we really wouldn't have to concern ourselves with who is being named a Justice, what their background is, or anything else about them. They should only have to be well trained in the law, and have a sense of staying with the program. What we always get down to near the end of discussions such as this one is that the Constitution is a guide. Every time we are forced to resort to the Supreme Court to resolve an issue, it implys that there has been a failure in the concept known as "the Rule of Law." And please don't assume you know what the term means unless you REALLY do know what it means. If you look at the history of the SC, you'll see a decision that "equal but separate is acceptable." A few years later, they reversed that verdict. There were no changes to any societal contexts between the two verdicts. The "Rule of Law" itself isn't quite as stable as I would like. I don't believe the Constitution is quite so sacred as to be above filling the needs of the times, by modification if necessary. We've experienced a reversal of an ammendment before. We've experienced reversals of the Supreme Court's understandings regarding the Constitution. And if a change will result in an improved understanding, I have no objections to changing the highest laws of the land. Finally, just because the present Articles and Ammendments are so broadly written doesn't necessitate that all future additions must follow the same form/format/style. I find absolutely no value in elegance for its own sake. Bill Vajk