Xref: utzoo comp.unix.wizards:25181 alt.security:2324
Path: utzoo!utgpu!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wuarchive!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!pacific.mps.ohio-state.edu!linac!unixhub!stanford.edu!rutgers!cmcl2!kramden.acf.nyu.edu!brnstnd
From: brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein)
Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards,alt.security
Subject: BSD tty security, part 4: What You Can Look Forward To
Message-ID: <3600:Apr2614:04:4391@kramden.acf.nyu.edu>
Date: 26 Apr 91 14:04:43 GMT
Organization: IR
Lines: 90

To close this series of postings, I'd like to briefly survey the state
of tty security. I'm sorry I haven't been able to respond personally or
quickly to everyone's mail on this issue.

Just a few years ago I was exploring the depths of an old Ultrix system.
It didn't take a genius to notice the occasional background jobs gone
astray---obviously any user could affect any other user's tty, despite
vhangup(). Soon I had ``blip'', a reasonably powerful tty mode mangler
that could act both as a concise stty and as a tty security breaker.
With it I could write arbitrary text to anyone's tty, TIOCSTI terminal
input, change tty mode settings, send tty signals, and so on.

So I sent copies of the code and documentation to the sysadmin at that
site, and posted a 300-line analysis to comp.unix.wizards. As I recall,
there were three responses. One asked what I was talking about. One was
from the admin describing what I now know to be only a partial fix. One
was from Steve Bellovin referring me to his then-new Session Tty paper
for descriptions of a few of the bugs as well as a complete (but
complex) fix for System V which, to my knowledge, has never been
implemented.

blip still works on every BSD UNIX machine I can find. It is trivial to
adapt to POSIX. And it has, unfortunately, been spreading slowly around
the net under the name of ``factor.''

That's right. Every available BSD UNIX machine allows any user to write
or type arbitrary characters on the tty of another user. With good
timing the attacker can even make his attack invisible---the moment a
sysadmin types a root command, someone could be piggybacking a command
like cp /bin/sh /tmp/sh; chmod 4755 /tmp/sh. And it gets worse.

How many people know how to exploit these bugs? Far too many, I'm sure,
but not enough to shock other admins into seeing the magnitude of this
problem. And this pales beside the examples set by vendors. I tell Sun
how insecure ttys are, and offer a bandaid: Sun tells me that POSIX
fixes everything, and refuses to admit that a bandaid is necessary.
Convex is finally waking up, but is still under the delusion that one
kernel kludge after another (from vhangup() to POSIX sessions and
beyond) will solve the fundamental problems of statically allocated,
world-usable ttys.

Berkeley is finally showing some interest in fixing the bugs, but it
will be years before vendors have picked up the changes, and several
years before the average machine on the net is safe. Sorry, but I'm not
going to wait that long. I am sick of constantly wondering whether my
users know enough to break security. I am sick of hearing that POSIX
fixes the problems. I am sick of seeing vendors blind themselves to such
a fundamental set of holes. You should be sick of it too.

So here's what I'm doing about it.

1. In part 3 of this series I outlined a reasonably simple set of fixes.
If you have a BSD-derived system where something in the plan doesn't
work, please post your comments here and we'll see what has to be done.
If you don't have source, and you want to be notified as soon as binary
patches are available, tell CERT your hardware type and OS version at
cert@cert.sei.cmu.edu.

2. I will dedicate some of my free time to working with vendors and
established authorities like CERT interested in tightening up tty
security.

3. So that programmers are insulated from these changes in the pty
subsystem, I commit myself to porting my pty manager to any platform I
have access to.

4. I will attempt to outline a minimal set of (optional) changes to the
POSIX standard to keep the standard from interfering with tty security.
I would be interested in hearing from POSIX committee members interested
in helping with this.

5. On or around October 29, 1992, I will publish a set of tiger programs
that test for and exploit the failures in BSD tty security that I have
described.

6. I will give further details on the security holes to anyone who
convinces me that he has a legitimate interest. That means I want a
verifiable chain of people and phone numbers from the contact for a
major network down to whoever wants the information, plus a better
excuse than ``I haven't read Bellovin's paper or your paper yet.''
If you simply want someone other than me to tell you that the holes
exist, ask bostic@okeeffe.berkeley.edu. (That's Keith Bostic, the guy in
charge of BSD; don't be surprised if he doesn't get to your message
immediately.) Please don't believe vendor assurances that the holes have
been fixed---they haven't.

I hope I've yelled enough about these bugs now. I hope that soon there
won't be anything to yell about.

---Dan