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From: ziane@nuri.inria.fr (ziane mikal @)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Conciousness
Message-ID: <2131@seti.inria.fr>
Date: 30 Apr 91 15:48:35 GMT
Article-I.D.: seti.2131
References: <91119.140920DOCTORJ@SLACVM.SLAC.STANFORD.EDU>
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In article <91119.140920DOCTORJ@SLACVM.SLAC.STANFORD.EDU>
DOCTORJ@SLACVM.SLAC.STANFORD.EDU (Jon J Thaler) writes:

>I'm not criticising Ziane Mikal in particular, but this theme seems to underly
>about 99% of the discussion.  Namely, no one knows what consciousness, pain
>or other subjective phenomena actually are (in terms of brain function).
>Given this, how are we ever going to decide whether a computer is doing
>"the real thing" or merely a simulation.  The situation is not the same as
>with computer simulations of the weather, where we know (more-or-less) what
>the real entity is.  Given this unfortunate state of affairs, what is the
>point of this line of discourse?

>Of course, maybe someone out there really *KNOWS* what we're talking about, in
>which case I'm eager to be enlightened.

Not "KNOWING" what something is, does not mean that you cannot recognize
the thing. When a hurricane arrives you may know that it is a hurricane
even if you are not a specialist in meteorology. 
I agree that I do not know very precisely what pain or consciousness is,
but it does not mean that I would not be able to recognize them. For example
if I have a long discussion with a machine, and if I know somehow how its
software is made, I may be convinced that the machine has some consciousness.
Of course more knowledge about these phenomenon would be of great help but
discussing whether a computer can simulate them or even have pain or some
concsciousness may help to understand better these concepts.

Mikal Ziane (Mikal.Ziane@nuri.inria.fr)